Rbi procura simplificar as regras cambiais

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Rbi procura simplificar as regras de forex
Dois grandes anúncios hoje!
Em primeiro lugar, acabamos de lançar uma demo gratuita na web para o Yeah Jam Fury: UME on Newgrounds! Agora você não tem desculpa para não dar uma chance ao nosso maluco jogo de plataforma de quebra-cabeça. Você pode jogar aqui:
Em seguida, você quer ganhar um cartão Amazon eGift de US $ 100 e mais? Bem, você está com sorte! Hoje nós estamos anunciando o início de uma competição de 1 mês de duração para o Yeah Builder! (E qualquer um pode participar gratuitamente graças à demonstração!)
Nós o apelidamos: o Concurso Construtor de Fúria da Construtora Stage da Sra. Carrot!
A partir de agora até 16 de março de 2018, aceitaremos seus estágios personalizados exportados do criador de palco totalmente desbloqueado temporariamente disponível nas versões demo comerciais do jogo. Esta é a oportunidade perfeita para exercitar suas habilidades de design de jogos e provar que você é o melhor arquiteto de palco para o Yeah Jam Fury no mundo!
Vamos julgar por 3 categorias, com um vencedor para cada uma:
LIGA Artística / YEAH (Quão legal de uma foto você fez) LIGA ATLÉTICA / JAM (Quão agitado é) Quebra-cabeça / LIGA DE FÚRIA (Quão difícil é)
Os vencedores de cada categoria receberão todos os itens a seguir:
$ 100 Amazon eGift Card Uma chave de download do Steam para Yeah Jam Fury: U, eu, todo mundo! Downloads digitais dos álbuns YJF 2012 e YJFUME Um pôster de alta resolução de uma manga real! (ou imagem digital equivalente de uma manga para residentes fora dos EUA)

É possível simplificar seriamente o GST.
Escopo para redução de placas de GST com mais receita, diz Jaitley.
GSTN reabre a janela para o esquema de composição.
Conselho do GST se encontra: Problemas de bandeira vermelha enfrentados pelos comerciantes.
Por que os consumidores devem receber o GST.
O sistema de geração de faturas minimizará falhas e será igualmente eficiente tanto para os negócios quanto para o governo.
A Rede Tributária de Bens e Serviços está enfrentando soluços iniciais, o que não surpreende. O mundo sobre qualquer novo sistema de TI leva de seis a nove meses de solução de problemas para acertar a maioria das coisas. Lembre-se das frequentes atualizações de sistema e software lançadas pela Microsoft e pela Oracle.
Mas a GSTN, sendo o sistema de compensação obrigatório das empresas indianas, não tem esse luxo. Mesmo quando a GSTN resolve problemas, ela precisa pensar em possibilidades para se fortalecer. Podemos tornar a interface do usuário mais simples e o fluxo interno do processo mais reto? Nós propomos tal sistema.
O novo sistema envolverá a criação de um novo módulo para uso nos negócios e no governo. Podemos chamá-lo de Invoice Generation System (IGS). O governo será o dono do IGS.
As empresas usariam o IGS para preparar faturas comerciais e pagar impostos. Eles não gerariam faturas em seus sistemas privados como fazem agora. Isso garantirá que o governo receba os dados relevantes no momento da geração da fatura; não há necessidade de esperar pelo arquivamento dos retornos pelas empresas.
Um exemplo explicará isso. Considere 2 firmas registradas A e B da GST. A empresa A concordou em vender 100 camisas para firmar B @ ₹ 200 por camisa. Taxa de GST em camisas é de 12 por cento. A empresa A usará o IGS para gerar uma fatura mencionando o número GSTN da empresa B. Para isso, a Empresa A entrará no número GSTN da Empresa B, detalhes da camisa e o preço acordado. O IGS buscará a taxa GST do sistema e os detalhes da empresa B dos registros de registro GST para preencher a fatura.
A fatura assim gerada mostraria que a Empresa B tem que pagar ₹ 24.000 para a Empresa A - ₹ 20.000 como o preço da camiseta e ₹ 4.000 como GST. Os dados da fatura podem ser visualizados on-line pela GSTN e pela Empresa B. A empresa B aceitaria os detalhes da fatura enviados pela Empresa A para declarar sua aceitação da fatura. A empresa B faria o pagamento das camisetas para a Empresa A. Nesse ponto, a função da IGS terminará e a GSTN assumirá a conclusão de processos, como o cálculo do crédito de imposto de entrada, a correspondência de faturas e assim por diante. Ambos A e B pagariam impostos com base em cálculos pela GSTN dos dados da fatura obtidos do IGS.
Benefícios do novo sistema.
O IGS seria um complemento útil para o GSTN. Isso encerrará a necessidade de registrar vários registros e devoluções. Os varejistas podem usar o IGS para gerar notas à vista no momento da venda final ao consumidor. A conta IGS do varejista já terá um registro das ações recebidas do atacadista. O governo poderia recolher o GST mesmo na última milha da transação, um ponto fraco até agora. Glitches no sistema existente irão cair com a adição do IGS no sistema GSTN.
Vamos entender os problemas enfrentados pelo sistema GSTN existente. Apesar de ter sido projetado para lidar com faturas de 300 crore carregadas por comerciantes de um crore todos os meses, enfrenta uma desaceleração freqüente. Precisa de muitos upgrades de design. Por exemplo, ao processar uma fatura com vários itens / taxas, a GSTN identifica apenas o primeiro item da fatura e trata o restante como duplicado.
Às vezes, os dados são perdidos se o usuário alternar as janelas para obter informações, como detalhes do fornecedor que solicita crédito fiscal de entrada. Questões de segurança, como o acesso a empresas não relacionadas, também foram relatadas. Tais questões são atendidas à medida que surgem em qualquer sistema. A GSTN não é uma exceção a isso.
Por conta das falhas do GSTN, as datas de arquivamento do GSTR 1 foram estendidas para 10 de outubro, GSTR 2 a 31 de outubro, GSTR 3 a 10 de novembro e GSTR 3B para dezembro. Mas enquanto as extensões dão tempo a firmas individuais e ao GSTN, elas também bloqueiam o processamento de restituições e transferência de dinheiro para os governos estaduais. Isso atrasa o ciclo de liquidação mensal da GSTN.
Muitos também estão preocupados com o sistema de faturas e-way prestes a ser operacional. Se enfrentar alguma falha, o movimento das mercadorias será interrompido.
O novo sistema e pequenas empresas.
Dirigindo-se a administradores de impostos no evento Rajasva Gyan Sangam em Nova Delhi, em 1º de setembro, o Primeiro Ministro Narendra Modi expressou suas preocupações sobre isso. "Devemos trabalhar no sentido de garantir que todos os traders, incluindo até os traders relativamente menores com um volume de negócios abaixo de ₹ 20 lakh, devem se registrar no sistema GST", disse ele. Ele pediu aos oficiais que projetassem um sistema para essa categoria, a fim de permitir que todos os operadores obtenham o máximo benefício do GST.
O primeiro-ministro entendeu, com razão, que as oportunidades de negócios para empresas fora do sistema GST seriam limitadas. Firmas não registradas não estão autorizadas a exportar-importar, vender em sites de comércio eletrônico ou vender para outros Estados. Empresas registradas no GST evitam comprar de empresas não registradas. Exigências onerosas de conformidade com o GST, como a apresentação de três retornos mensais, são a principal razão que impede as pequenas empresas de ingressarem no regime de GST. A adoção do IGS no sistema GSTN existente irá aliviar esses medos.
A adoção do IGS removerá a diferença entre transações comerciais reais e relatadas. A arrecadação de impostos aumentará, pois não haverá transações não declaradas. O trabalho de auditoria e vigilância será reduzido. A adoção do IGS reduzirá o ônus sobre os servidores GSTN.
O IGS é uma ideia discutida ativamente entre uma pequena equipe de profissionais que desejam ver o GST bem-sucedido. Temos certeza de que será um fator de mudança e ajudará pequenas empresas a se unirem ao mundo das GST em grande número.
O escritor está com o serviço de comércio indiano. As visões são pessoais.
Relacionado
Escopo para redução de placas de GST com mais receita, diz Jaitley.
GSTN reabre a janela para o esquema de composição.
Conselho do GST se encontra: Problemas de bandeira vermelha enfrentados pelos comerciantes.
Por que os consumidores devem receber o GST.
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Golpe de PNB: como um sistema foi jogado.
Golpe de PNB: como um sistema foi jogado.
De comunicações interbancárias a processos de auditoria, todas as verificações e.
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Priya Varrier e economia do estrelato de mídia social.
Ah, a garota no vídeo da "piscadela"! A jovem atriz Malayalam.
De auditorias e irregularidades.
Refere-se a "auditores de falhas Arun Jaitley, gerenciamento de fraudes PNB".
Abrindo carvão.
A iniciativa de lançar minas de carvão abertas à participação privada é bem-vinda, mas.
A privatização de PSBs não resolverá o problema.
A questão não é de propriedade, mas de falha de controles internos e.
Muitos erros e acertos de Sharif.
Com o Paquistão rumo às eleições gerais, agora é a hora de Nova Délhi.
Comece uma nova corrida de duas rodas.
É um "ataque dos peixinhos", como um punhado de startups tenta esculpir.
Regulando pagamentos digitais.
O recurso de pagamento do WhatsApp gera preocupações sobre transparência e fair play.
Tática de Diversão.
A sugestão da Assocham de privatizar os PSBs como uma solução para evitar.
Política e a arte da teatralidade.
Como os líderes são projetados para as massas e como a boa governança não é.
Últimas em Opinião.
Golpe de PNB: como um sistema foi jogado.
De comunicações interbancárias a processos de auditoria, todas as verificações e.
Priya Varrier e economia do estrelato de mídia social.
Ah, a garota no vídeo da "piscadela"! A jovem atriz Malayalam.
De auditorias e irregularidades.
Refere-se a "auditores de falhas Arun Jaitley, gerenciamento de fraudes PNB".
Abrindo carvão.
A iniciativa de lançar minas de carvão abertas à participação privada é bem-vinda, mas.
A privatização de PSBs não resolverá o problema.
A questão não é de propriedade, mas de falha de controles internos e.
Muitos erros e acertos de Sharif.
Com o Paquistão rumo às eleições gerais, agora é a hora de Nova Délhi.
Comece uma nova corrida de duas rodas.
É um "ataque dos peixinhos", como um punhado de startups tenta esculpir.
Regulando pagamentos digitais.
O recurso de pagamento do WhatsApp gera preocupações sobre transparência e fair play.
Tática de Diversão.
A sugestão da Assocham de privatizar os PSBs como uma solução para evitar.
Política e a arte da teatralidade.
Como os líderes são projetados para as massas e como a boa governança não é.
Não mais no modo avião.
A recomendação do TRAI para permitir serviços Wi-Fi em voo é um passo positivo e, se estruturado adequadamente,.
Contagem regressiva para o Mobile World Congress.
O show para todas as coisas móveis está a poucos dias de distância, com Samsung, Xiaomi e outros todos chegando com o carro-chefe.
O outro, o mais alto telefone Redmi.
Pague um pouco mais e ganhe um pouco mais se quiser um dispositivo mais rápido com uma câmera melhor.
Ótimo som para impulsionar seus treinos.
Se você é do tipo ao ar livre, o novo Soundsport Free da Bose pode se adequar ao seu estilo. Eles não são gratuitos em dinheiro.
Quantum Long Term Equity: Este é para o seu portfólio principal.
Este fundo de grande capitalização é uma boa opção para investidores de longo prazo que procuram um participante de valor.
Icici Prudential Focada em Patrimônio Líquido: Retorno seguro com foco de grande capitalização.
O fundo tem contido perdas durante as baixas, oferecendo retornos saudáveis.
Man Indústrias India (₹ 126.8)
Investidores com perspectiva de curto prazo podem comprar ações da Man Industries (Índia) nos níveis atuais. O .
Day Trading Guide For 22 de fevereiro.
Dada a seguir são suportes e resistências para Nifty 50 futuros e sete ações principais que podem ajudar no seu.
Livros de culinária: as edições medievais.
Elaborar receitas indianas registradas há quase cinco séculos, hoje estão espalhadas em bibliotecas e museus.
Questionário sobre espíritos.
Na demanda popular, o quiz desta semana é sobre espíritos.1 Qual frase de duas palavras deve ter.
Dia de Felinetines.
Nas últimas três noites, fomos aterrorizados pelos gritos mais horríveis. Política do gato: dois machos, um.
Jailbird por um dia.
Uma cadeia de 222 anos em Telangana está vendo uma enxurrada de visitantes dispostos a pagar por um pouco da vida na prisão.
Montando em aspirações.
A nova promessa de marca da Tata Motors entra em foco na Auto Expo.
Colocando pimenta para trabalhar.
O robô humanóide da SoftBank pode ser amigo, embaixador da marca e ativo comercial.
Novo visual para a Lufthansa.
A Lufthansa revelou uma imagem de marca modernizada para a era digital. Um comunicado de imprensa diz o mais visível.
A IA governa a mentalidade dos profissionais de marketing.
Uma pesquisa do LinkedIn diz que a tecnologia dominará os esforços para personalizar o marketing.
A revolução silenciosa do LPG.
O esquema de Ujjwala está permitindo que as mulheres rurais fujam do trabalho penoso e dos efeitos negativos do uso na saúde.
Ujjwala ilumina sonhos.
Apenas 20 quilômetros de Ahmedabad, em um Thakor vaas em Manipur aldeia de Sanand Taluka, Kaliben Thakor.
Snafus no círculo eleitoral do PM.
Aldeias modestas ao longo da estrada do aeroporto de Varanasi até a cidade contam um conto de como após a inicial.
Desafio é mudar o padrão comportamental: Pradhan.
Dharmendra Pradhan, Ministro do Petróleo e Gás Natural, está satisfeito com o sucesso de Pradhan Mantri.

Etiqueta: PBOC.
Rede Global de Segurança Financeira: Reservas Regionais de Reserva e Redes de Troca de Moeda dos Bancos Centrais.
Rede Global de Segurança Financeira: Reservas Regionais de Reserva e Redes de Troca de Moeda dos Bancos Centrais.
Você pode ler este post de duas perspectivas.
Geo Strategic (Arquitetura Financeira e Financeira Internacional) Financial and Economic stability / Política Macro-prudencial.
A recente crise financeira expôs o fato de que a liquidez financeira global pode estar em falta. Já o dólar americano é a moeda global e é usado em mais de 40% de todas as transações financeiras no mundo.
Os países asiáticos enfrentaram a escassez de dólares durante a crise financeira asiática de 1997-1998. Recentes crises financeiras globais causaram escassez de dólares em países avançados. O Federal Reserve do Banco Central dos EUA respondeu estabelecendo linhas de swap de moedas com bancos centrais de outros países. Essas linhas de swap se tornaram permanentes em 2013.
Após a crise financeira asiática em 1997, muitos países nos países em desenvolvimento começaram a acumular reservas cambiais. Houve também um acordo de troca (conhecido como Iniciativa de Chiang Mai) que foi estabelecido entre os países da ASEAN no sudeste da Ásia.
As nações também vão ao FMI para obter financiamento condicional que não gostam de fazer. A nova tendência é para o agrupamento regional de recursos financeiros. O exemplo mais recente é o BRICS CRA.
Mesmo as economias avançadas, como a UE, criaram o Mecanismo Europeu de Estabilidade (MEE).
A Iniciativa de Chiang Mai foi reformulada como o Multilateralismo da Iniciativa de Chiang Mai (CMIM).
Estabilidade Financeira e Econômica / Macro Política Prudencial.
Iniciativa de Chiang Mai (CMI) Multi-Lateralismo da Iniciativa de Chiang Mai (CMIM) Arranjo Contingente de Reservas (CRA) do BRICS Mecanismo Europeu de Estabilidade (ESM)
Federal Reserve Central Bank Linhas de Troca de Dólar Americano PBOC China Banco Central RMB Swap Lines.
From O sistema monetário global descentralizado requer uma rede de segurança eficiente.
A rede de segurança financeira global como um conjunto de mecanismos de proteção.
O atual sistema descentralizado também carece de uma autoridade central que esteja ativamente integrada e, acima de tudo, vinculada contratualmente à manutenção do sistema monetário, fornecendo liquidez temporária, como o FMI no sistema de Bretton Woods. Em vez disso, vários mecanismos de proteção evoluíram porque o sistema atual não levou a uma maior estabilidade externa das economias nacionais e da economia global. O problema dos voláteis fluxos de capital tornou-se particularmente claro mais uma vez no curso da crise financeira de 2008 e 2009. Para as economias de mercado emergentes, o aviso de uma reversão repentina dos fluxos de capital tem sido omnipresente desde a crise asiática. No entanto, a última crise demonstrou que, mesmo para os países industrializados, os mercados financeiros desenvolvidos são um mecanismo de contágio significativo para a evolução da crise. Os seguintes elementos são considerados elementos-chave da rede global de segurança financeira: 11.
Reservas internacionais. Estas incluem as reservas oficiais de divisas e ouro, bem como as reclamações sobre instituições financeiras internacionais, como o FMI, que podem ser rapidamente convertidas em divisas estrangeiras sob os países & # 8217; responsabilidade própria. •
Acordos bilaterais de swap entre bancos centrais. Num swap de divisas, dois bancos centrais concordam em trocar montantes em moeda, e. Dólares dos EUA por euros. Eles concordam em uma data fixa no futuro em que reverterão a transação aplicando a mesma taxa de câmbio. Durante o prazo, os bancos centrais podem fazer empréstimos em moeda estrangeira para bancos privados. •
Programas do FMI e acordos de financiamento regional (por exemplo, Mecanismo Europeu de Estabilidade, Acordo de Multilateralização da Iniciativa de Chiang Mai, BRICs CRA, Fundo Monetário Árabe, Fundo de Reserva da América Latina). Eles disponibilizam recursos financeiros para os membros para enfrentar as dificuldades do balanço de pagamentos, gerenciar crises e evitar efeitos regionais de contágio. Dependendo da sua concepção, podem impor condições e requisitos para medidas de política económica nos países beneficiários. Alguns programas regionais requerem uma combinação com fundos do FMI.
O elemento mais importante dos mecanismos de proteção: reservas internacionais.
As reservas internacionais são de longe o maior elemento da rede de segurança global.12 A falta de previsibilidade e robustez de outros elementos levou a uma acumulação excessiva de reservas. Depois da crise asiática, os países de renda média alta em particular acumularam reservas. Enquanto a China detém a maior parte das reservas neste grupo de países, todos os outros países também aumentaram significativamente suas reservas. Como resultado das intervenções do banco central no mercado de câmbio, as reservas diminuíram desde o ano de 2013.
O renascimento dos acordos de swap bilaterais.
Os acordos bilaterais de swap foram usados ​​pelo Tesouro dos EUA em 1936 para suprir os países em desenvolvimento com empréstimos-ponte. Durante o período de Bretton Woods, o Fed introduziu uma rede de linhas de swap conhecidas como acordos cambiais recíprocos para evitar uma retirada súbita e substancial de ouro por instituições oficiais estrangeiras.13 Uma troca protegeu os bancos centrais estrangeiros do risco da taxa de câmbio quando eles obtiveram excesso e posições do dólar indesejadas. Isso permitiu que eles dispensassem a conversão temporária de dólares em ouro. Entre 1973 e 1980, as linhas de swap foram usadas em vez de reservas de moeda dos EUA para financiar intervenções do Fed no mercado de câmbio. Ganhos e perdas foram compartilhados com o outro banco central quando o Fed desenhou uma linha. No entanto, os bancos centrais do G10 poderiam tentar usar os acordos de swap para influenciar as intervenções do mercado de moeda estrangeira dos EUA, de modo que o Fed parou de usá-los em meados dos anos 80. Todas as linhas de swap existentes, com exceção das do Canadá e México, foram encerradas em 1998. Após os ataques terroristas de 11 de setembro de 2001, o Fed estabeleceu linhas de swap com o Banco Central Europeu e o Banco da Inglaterra por 30 dias e expandiu a linha existente com o Banco da Inglaterra. Banco do Canadá. Os swaps cambiais foram usados ​​aqui pela primeira vez para restaurar a liquidez nos mercados financeiros. Durante a crise financeira global, o Fed financiou as ações de credor de último recurso de outros bancos centrais em economias de mercado industrializadas e emergentes, com o segundo assumindo o risco de crédito. As reservas internacionais de muitos bancos centrais no início da crise eram menores do que as quantias emprestadas sob as linhas de swap. Em 2013, os acordos de swap entre os seis bancos centrais mais importantes foram convertidos em arranjos permanentes. Todos estes acordos de swap têm uma coisa em comum: eles sinalizam os bancos centrais & # 8217; disposição de cooperar entre si, seja em defesa das paridades do sistema de Bretton Woods, para evitar ataques especulativos contra o Fed, ou com o objetivo de prover liquidez em dólar durante a crise financeira. A China também estabeleceu um sistema abrangente de acordos de swap, principalmente com o objetivo de avançar com a internacionalização do renminbi. Mas, do ponto de vista desses bancos centrais, os acordos com o Banco da Inglaterra, a Autoridade Monetária de Cingapura, o Banco Central da Austrália e o BCE também servem ao objetivo de fornecer liquidez renminbi em sua área de responsabilidade quando necessário. representam uma ferramenta poderosa e flexível dos bancos centrais que emitem divisas de reserva para regular os fluxos internacionais de capital. Os bancos centrais são as únicas instituições capazes de mudar seus balanços com rapidez suficiente para acompanhar a volatilidade dos fluxos internacionais de capital. Os swaps são inadequados, no entanto, para crises mais duradouras, crises de dívida soberana e para financiar desequilíbrios na balança de pagamentos. É por isso que eles seriam a ferramenta mais adequada para as economias de mercado emergentes, pois é mais provável que enfrentem mudanças bruscas nos fluxos de capital. No entanto, até agora apenas os bancos centrais mais importantes que emitem divisas de reserva conseguiram acessar swaps ilimitados. A concessão é determinada pelo mandato dos bancos centrais e eles representam acordos contratuais, e não institucionais. Conseqüentemente, os bancos centrais podem escolher seus parceiros contratuais, e não há autoridade independente central para supervisionar os acordos de swap. Espera-se, portanto, que os acordos de swap para bancos centrais em países industrializados que não emitem uma moeda de reserva sejam restabelecidos no caso de um choque global, enquanto eles são menos prováveis ​​de serem empregados em caso de um choque regional. Seu uso é ainda menos previsível para economias de mercado emergentes sistêmicas.
Crescimento da Rede Global de Segurança Financeira.
Características dos Instrumentos na rede Global Financial Safety.
Uso de GFSN em vários cenários de choque.
Choque do balanço de pagamentos Setor bancário FX Choque de liquidez Choque da dívida soberana.
Esses seis bancos centrais possuem linhas de permuta permanentes em dólares americanos desde 2013.
Durante a crise financeira global, o Federal Reserve estendeu os acordos de swap para outros 14 bancos centrais. O BCE atraiu muito fortemente, seguido pelo BoJ. Em um ponto durante a crise em 2009, os swaps pendentes somaram mais de US $ 580 bilhões e representaram cerca de um quarto do balanço do Fed. O elemento inovador desse esforço foi a extensão dos swaps para quatro países fora do conjunto usual de bancos centrais dos países avançados: México, Brasil, Coréia do Sul e Cingapura.16 O México já tinha uma instalação permanente de swap com o Federal Reserve em virtude de operações geográficas. e o Acordo de Livre Comércio da América do Norte, mas o novo acordo expandiu a quantia que o banco central mexicano poderia atrair e os swaps do Fed com o Brasil, a Coréia do Sul e Cingapura abriram novos caminhos. Os swaps em geral foram creditados com a prevenção de uma apreensão mais séria dos empréstimos interbancários e dos mercados financeiros durante 2008 a 2009 (Helleiner 2014, 38-45; Prasad 2014, 202-11; FMI 2013a; 2014a, Caixa 2). O conselho de governadores do Federal Reserve (Fed, o banco central dos EUA) considerou longamente a questão da “fronteira”, dividida entre abrir-se a demandas adicionais por cobertura de mercados emergentes e criar estigma contra aqueles deixados de fora da rede de segurança. As autoridades do Fed usaram o tamanho econômico e as conexões com os mercados financeiros internacionais como os principais critérios para selecionar o Brasil, o México, Cingapura e a Coréia do Sul. Chile, Peru, Indonésia, Índia, Islândia e outros provavelmente solicitaram swaps, mas foram negados. Os governadores queriam desviar pedidos de outros países para o FMI, que coordenou seu anúncio do SLF com o anúncio do Fed dos swaps adicionais no final de outubro de 2008. Governadores e funcionários viram nesta divisão uma divisão natural do trabalho que coincidiu com os recursos e a capacidade analítica do Fed e do FMI.17 O BCE estendeu os swaps à Hungria, Polônia, Suécia, Suíça e Dinamarca, além de seu acordo com os Estados Unidos. O BoJ também estendeu os swaps, principalmente para a Coréia do Sul, depois que o Federal Reserve anunciou sua troca coreana. O PBoC começou a concluir um conjunto de acordos de swap com bancos centrais da Ásia e de países não asiáticos que eventualmente chegariam a mais de 20 e totalizariam 2,57 trilhões de RMB. Apenas os swaps com os bancos centrais de Hong Kong, Cingapura e Coréia do Sul são conhecidos por terem sido ativados (Zhang 2015, 5). Aumentar o papel do renminbi no comércio internacional foi o objetivo expresso desses swaps, embora seu estabelecimento também tenha ajudado a garantir a confiança do mercado durante os tempos não resolvidos. A proliferação de swaps resultou em um conjunto de redes de acordos em forma de estrela entre os bancos centrais que foram ligados pela liquidez do Fed (Allen e Moessner, 2010). Embora alguns dos swaps da rede tenham sido ativados, apenas os swaps do Federal Reserve foram intensamente utilizados durante a crise. Os "quatro afortunados" países de mercados emergentes entre o Fed 14 foram cobertos por quantias de até US $ 30 bilhões, mas apenas temporariamente. Quando o Fed mais tarde se recusou a renovar os swaps, esses países ficaram tão vulneráveis ​​a déficits de liquidez quanto os outros. Assim, quando a Coreia do Sul assumiu a presidência do G20 em 2010, seu governo propôs que os swaps do banco central fossem multilateralizados de forma mais permanente. Argumentou que isso seria cada vez mais necessário para estabilizar o sistema financeiro global e seria do interesse dos fornecedores e receptores de swap. Especificamente, durante os preparativos para a cúpula do G20, autoridades sul-coreanas propuseram que os bancos centrais dos países avançados fornecessem swaps ao FMI, os quais conduziriam a devida diligência e forneceriam liquidez aos bancos centrais qualificados. Dessa forma, a comunidade global poderia mobilizar recursos suficientes para enfrentar até mesmo uma enorme crise de liquidez e os bancos centrais evitariam o risco de crédito.
No final de 2013, seis bancos centrais em moeda-chave tornaram as suas instalações temporárias de permuta permanentes. Cada banco central firmou um acordo bilateral com os outros cinco, compreendendo uma rede de 30 desses acordos.18 Mas eles preferem manter uma ambigüidade construtiva no que diz respeito a se eles estariam novamente os acordos de swap para os outros bancos centrais cobertos durante a crise financeira global, incluindo o Brasil, o México, 19 a Coréia do Sul e Cingapura (Papadia 2013).
Durante a crise financeira global de 2008-2009, o Federal Reserve estendeu linhas de swap do USD a vários bancos centrais. As instituições financeiras desses países enfrentaram a escassez de USD, uma vez que os canais normais dos mercados monetários congelaram durante a crise.
Os montantes de Swap do Dólar Americano aumentaram durante a Crise Financeira Global de 2008-2009.
Durante a crise financeira global de 2007-8, o sistema monetário internacional sofreu uma grave escassez de dólares dos EUA que reduziu severamente o comércio global e pressionou os negócios bancários internacionais (McCauley e McGuire, 2009; McGuire e von Peter, 2009). As autoridades dos EUA, em resposta à elevada pressão no mercado global, organizaram linhas de swap de dólar com os principais bancos centrais para mitigar o aperto global do dólar (Aizenman e Pasricha, 2010; Aizenman, Jinjarak e Park, 2011). Na quinta-feira, 31 de outubro de 2013, a rede de bancos centrais compreende o Banco do Canadá, o Banco da Inglaterra, o Banco do Japão, o Banco Central Europeu, o Federal Reserve e o Banco Nacional Suíço concordaram em converter seu swap bilateral de liquidez. arranjos para acordos permanentes até nova ordem.1 O aperto do dólar ilustrou de forma crítica o perigo de operar um sistema financeiro global centrado nos EUA. Neste contexto, a China implementou ativamente medidas de promoção do uso transfronteiriço da moeda chinesa, o renminbi (RMB), para reduzir sua dependência do dólar dos EUA. O movimento agressivo da política foi considerado um sinal claro dos esforços da China para internacionalizar o RMB (Chen e Cheung, 2011; Cheung, Ma e McCauley, 2011). Em 2009, a China lançou o esquema de liquidação comercial transfronteiriça em RMB para incentivar a denominação e liquidação do comércio internacional em suas próprias moedas. Uma questão prática de liquidar o comércio no RMB é a disponibilidade limitada da moeda fora da China. A China naquela época tinha regulamentos rígidos sobre a circulação do RMB através de sua fronteira. Para facilitar sua iniciativa de liquidação comercial do RMB, a China assinou seu primeiro contrato bilateral de RMB com o Banco da Coréia em dezembro de 2008, e o segundo com Hong Kong em janeiro de 2009. Desde então, a China assinou vários acordos de swap com economias ao redor. o mundo.2.
As 5ª e 6ª Cúpulas dos BRICS em 2013-2014 marcaram um divisor de águas na evolução do grupo dos BRICS com o estabelecimento das primeiras instituições do BRICS. Entre eles, o Novo Banco de Desenvolvimento do BRICS, o CRA, o Conselho Empresarial do BRICS e o Think Tanks Council. Embora isso tenha enfraquecido a percepção política do grupo, os críticos questionaram se essas instituições terão um efeito substantivo. Em particular, dúvidas foram lançadas sobre a eficácia do CRA.
O CRA é modesto em comparação com o FMI e outros arranjos semelhantes, como a Multilateralização da Iniciativa de Chiang Mai (CMIM). Nesta fase, os países do BRICS comprometeram US $ 100 bilhões para o CRA, com a China comprometendo US $ 41 bilhões, a Rússia, o Brasil e a Índia, US $ 18 bilhões cada, e a África do Sul, US $ 5 bilhões. O CMIM supostamente tem uma reserva de US $ 240 bilhões e os recursos do FMI de US $ 780 bilhões. Observou-se que, com as reservas internacionais do BRICS em cerca de US $ 5 trilhões, um compromisso de 16% levaria o pool de CRA a US $ 800 bilhões.
DAS REDES DE SEGURANÇA FINANCEIRA GLOBAL E REGIONAL: LIÇÕES DA EUROPA E DA ÁSIA.
ASEAN + Japan Korea China.
O embrião de um arranjo da rede regional de segurança da Ásia existe desde 1977, quando os cinco membros fundadores da ASEAN assinaram o ASEAN Swap Arrangement (ASA) 5. Após a crise asiática e depois de uma discussão abortada sobre a criação de um Fundo Monetário Asiático, o Japão lançou a Iniciativa Nova Miyazawa em outubro de 1998, no valor de US $ 35 bilhões, destinada a estabilizar os mercados cambiais da Indonésia, República da Coréia e Malásia. , Filipinas e Tailândia6. A iniciativa foi particularmente valiosa em conter a instabilidade no setor financeiro da Malásia, uma vez que esse país havia recusado um Acordo Stand-By do FMI. A manobra japonesa foi considerada um tanto rebelde, já que o FMI era muito crítico em relação à abordagem da Malásia. Mas também cimentou a idéia de que a Ásia poderia reunir recursos suficientes para se embolsar durante um período de crise, desde que os países asiáticos se unissem e conseguissem implantar mecanismos de apoio oportunos e confiáveis. Nos países asiáticos sob programas do FMI, a condicionalidade associada aos empréstimos incluiu severos cortes fiscais, profundas reformas estruturais e aumentos substanciais nas taxas de juros para estabilizar os mercados de câmbio. O custo econômico e social do ajuste foi tão alto e abrupto que provocou agitação social em vários países. Isso repercutiria fortemente nos meses seguintes e deixaria uma cicatriz duradoura nas relações entre os países asiáticos e o FMI7. Essa experiência alimentou tanto a disposição de se autossegurar por meio do acúmulo acelerado de reservas quanto a fortalecer os arranjos regionais para reduzir a dependência de redes de segurança financeira globais. Com base nessa lição, o CMI foi formalizado em maio de 2000 durante a Reunião dos Ministros das Finanças da ASEAN + 38. Baseou-se em grande parte nos acordos ASA originais e de swap bilateral envolvendo a RPC, Japão e República da Coréia, mas se baseou em um programa mais amplo que também incluiu o desenvolvimento do mercado de títulos em moeda local da Ásia e introduziu uma revisão econômica regional e diálogo político para mecanismo de vigilância da região (Kawai e Houser 2007). A iniciativa incluiu os novos membros da ASEAN, aumentando o número total de partes do acordo de 5 para 10. A Tabela A.1 do apêndice destaca a evolução do CMI. A questão da cooperação entre o CMI e o FMI rapidamente se tornou bastante acalorada, com vários países argumentando que laços fortes com o Fundo iriam frustrar o propósito inicial da iniciativa (Korea Institute of Finance, 2012), mas os vínculos foram mantidos ambos para mitigar o risco moral (Sussangkarn, 2011) e para garantir alguma consistência com a condicionalidade ligada aos programas do próprio FMI. Após a criação formal do CMI em 2000, a era da Grande Moderação que seguiu em algum grau reduziu as ambições de fortalecer os arranjos regionais. Como resultado, quando a crise financeira global atingiu em 2008, a rede de segurança financeira regional da Ásia mostrou-se modesta demais para desempenhar um papel significativo.
De fato, em vez de buscar apoio sob o CMI, o Banco da Coréia e a Autoridade Monetária de Cingapura buscaram um acordo de troca com o Federal Reserve dos EUA por cerca de US $ 30 bilhões cada. A República da Coreia concluiu acordos bilaterais com o Japão e a RPC que não estavam relacionados com o CMI. Da mesma forma, a Indonésia estabeleceu linhas de swap bilaterais separadas com o Japão e a RPC para reforçar seu colchão de crise e não recorreu ao CMI para suporte de crédito (Sussangkarn, 2011). O plano para consolidar os acordos de swap bilateral e formar um mecanismo único, mais sólido e efetivo de agrupamento de reservas - inicialmente apresentado pelos ministros de finanças da ASEAN + 3 em maio de 2007 em Kyoto - foi acelerado e evoluiu em várias iterações. antes que a versão final fosse apresentada mais de dois anos depois. Em dezembro de 2009, o CMI foi multilateralizado e os representantes da ASEAN + 3 assinaram o Acordo de Multilateralização da Iniciativa de Chiang Mai (CMIM), que efetivamente se tornou vinculante em 24 de março de 2010 (BSP, 2012). Essas sucessivas transformações fortaleceram a iniciativa, mas permanecem em grande parte não testadas. Além disso, outros aspectos de qualquer acordo financeiro regional credível, como capacidade de vigilância e coordenação de algumas políticas econômicas básicas, permanecem relativamente embrionários.
DAS REDES DE SEGURANÇA FINANCEIRA GLOBAL E REGIONAL: LIÇÕES DA EUROPA E DA ÁSIA.
A história das redes de segurança financeira europeias não pode ser dissociada da história da integração monetária europeia. Com esta perspectiva em mente, remonta ao final dos anos 1960 e tem sido um debate em curso até hoje. A história da integração política européia em cada turno é marcada por projetos fracassados ​​ou mecanismos reais de solidariedade financeira, que vão desde arranjos de câmbio frouxos até o projeto de um Fundo Monetário Europeu de pleno direito. O advento da união monetária foi precisamente concebido para reduzir a necessidade de redes de segurança financeira na área do euro. Mas as deficiências arquitectónicas da área do euro e a falta de transferências internas exigiram o estabelecimento de mecanismos alternativos de seguros mútuos desde o início da crise do euro em 2010. Em 2008, quando a crise financeira global se abateu, a Hungria acumulou desequilíbrios externos importantes e grandes exposições cambiais. Teve que procurar ajuda financeira quase imediatamente e iniciou contatos com o FMI. A total ausência de coordenação com as autoridades européias foi um choque inicial, pois mostrou que, apesar de décadas de intensa integração econômica, política e monetária, os países da UE ainda podiam necessitar de assistência financeira internacional. A experiência levou as instituições europeias a desenterrarem uma disposição esquecida do Tratado de Maastricht para fornecer assistência financeira através do Mecanismo de Assistência à Balança de Pagamentos9. Isso criou uma coordenação preliminar e, a priori, ad-hoc entre o FMI e a Comissão Européia, que estava redescobrindo a concepção e o monitoramento dos programas de ajuste macroeconômico. Apesar do uso rápido deste mecanismo e do surgimento de uma estrutura de cooperação com o FMI, o contágio da crise financeira global continuou por meses e levou alguns líderes do Leste Europeu a buscar apoio mais amplo e preventivo10, que fracassou. No entanto, além da participação oficial do setor, houve uma percepção relativamente rápida de que a contenção bancária e financeira transfronteiriça poderia se tornar uma importante fonte de ruptura financeira e propagar ainda mais a crise - inclusive de volta ao núcleo da Europa, já que os grandes bancos europeus expostos à Europa Oriental através de redes vastas e densas de filiais e subsidiárias. Em resposta, no final de fevereiro de 2009, sob a liderança do Banco Europeu de Reconstrução e Desenvolvimento (BERD), o Banco Europeu de Investimento (BEI) e o Banco Mundial decidiram estabelecer o que ficou conhecido como Iniciativa de Viena. This was designed as a joint multilateral and private sector coordination and enforcement mechanism to reduce the risk of banking sector sudden stops. In particular, it compelled cross-border European banks to continue to provide appropriate liquidity to their branches and subsidiaries in Central and Eastern Europe. The formalisation of such an arrangement11 quite early in the crisis has certainly proven the case for coordination of financial institutions in emerging-market economies, especially when a relatively small number of institutions have a disproportionate impact on capital flows. But with the crisis spreading to the euro area, starting with Greece in the fall of 2010, new regional arrangements proved necessary. The lack of instruments forced European officials to first consider bilateral assistance from member states. The idea of involving the IMF was initially violently rejected 9 on intellectual and political grounds12 but proved inevitable. In a number of successive iterations, more solid regional arrangements were designed (Bijlsma and Vallée 2012). Table A.2 in the appendix shows the evolution of European regional financial safety nets.
List of Regional Financial Agreements (RFA)
RMB Bilateral Currency Swaps Reserve Pooling CMI CMIM BRICS CRA AMRO IMF SDR Basket Currency Internationalization Global Liquidity Funding Liquidity Market Liquidity BRICS NDB CHINA AIIB Regional Integration Multilateralism Multipolar FX Swap Networks Central Banks Reserve Currency Global Financial Safety Nets (GFSN) Foreign Exchange Reserves Regional Financial Agreements (RFA) Regional Financial Networks (RFN) Bilateral Currency Swap Agreement (BSA) RMB (Renminbi also known as Yuan) International Lender of Last Resort (ILOLR) Regional Financial Safety Net (RFSN) Multilateral Financial Safety Net (MFSN) National Financial Safety Net (NFSN)
Self-Insurance, Reserve Pooling Arrangements, and Pre-emptive Financing.
Regional Reserve Pooling Arrangements.
Suman S. Basu Ran Bi.
First Draft: 8 February, 2010 This Draft: 7 June, 2010.
Toward a functional Chiang Mai Initiative.
Author: Chalongphob Sussangkarn, TDRI.
The International Financial Architecture and the Role of Regional Funds.
Universidade da California, Berkeley.
Examining the case for Reserve Pooling in East Asia: Empirical Analysis.
Ramkishen S. Rajan, Reza Siregar and Graham Bird.
Financial Architectures and Development: Resilience, Policy Space and Human Development in the Global South.
by Ilene Grabel.
International reserves and swap lines: substitutes or complements?
Yothin Jinjarak, and Donghyun Park,
How can we fix the global financial safety net?
Regional Monetary Cooperation: Lessons from the Euro Crisis for Developing Areas?
The Global Dollar System.
Stephen G Cecchetti.
The Future of the IMF and of Regional Cooperation in East Asia.
Yung Chul Park, Charles Wyplosz.
China’s Bilateral Currency Swap Agreements: Recent Trends.
The Spread of Chinese Swaps.
Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization.
The Chiang Mai Initiative.
Beyond the Chiang Mai Initiative: Prospects for Regional Financial and Monetary Integration in East Asia.
Currency internationalisation: an overview.
Embedded Domestic Preferences and Internationally Nested Constraints in Regional Institution Building in East Asia.
Emergent International Liquidity Agreements: Central Bank Cooperation after the Global Financial Crisis.
Regional Financial Cooperation in Asia.
East Asian Economic Cooperation and Integration: Japan’s Perspective.
What Motivates Regional Financial Cooperation in East Asia Today?
Evaluating Asian Swap Arrangements.
Joshua Aizenman, Yothin Jinjarak, and Donghyun Park.
No. 297 July 2011.
Regional Monetary Cooperation in East Asia Should the United States Be Concerned?
Wen Jin Yuan Melissa Murphy.
Chiang Mai Initiative as the Foundation of Financial Stability in East Asia.
COMPLEX DECISION IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF ASIAN REGIONAL FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENT.
Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization.
Is the Renminbi Destined to Become a Global or Regional Currency?
Monetary and financial cooperation in Asia: taking stock of recent ongoings.
Ramkishen S. Rajan.
FINANCIAL CRISES AND EAST ASIA’S FINANCIAL COOPERATION.
By Park Young-joon.
MONETARY INTEGRATION IN EAST ASIA.
Regional cooperation for financial and exchange rates stability in East Asia.
ASIAN FINANCIAL CO-OPERATION.
Address by Mr GR Stevens.
The Rise of China and Regional Integration in East Asia.
REGIONAL FINANCIAL COOPERATION IN EAST ASIA: THE CHIANG MAI INITIATIVE AND BEYOND.
Financial RegionaliSm: a Review oF the iSSueS.
The layers of the global financial safety net: taking stock.
Regional Financial Arrangements for East Asia: A Different Agenda from Latin America.
By Yung Chul Park.
Elasticity and Discipline in the Global Swap Network.
Working Paper No. 27 November 12, 2015.
Swap Agreements & China’s RMB Currency Network.
Central Bank Currency Swaps and the International Monetary System.
Renminbi internationalisation – The pace quickens.
What Will China’s RMB Bilateral Currency Swap Deals Lead To?
Emergent International Liquidity Agreements: Central Bank Cooperation after the Global Financial Crisis.
Currency Swap of Central Bank: Influence on International Currency System.
Building Global and Regional Financial Safety Nets.
Is the Renminbi Destined to Become a Global or Regional Currency?
China’s Bilateral Currency Swap Lines.
Yin-Wong Cheung, Hung Hing Ying LIN Zhitao.
Internationalisation of the Chinese Currency: Towards a Multipolar International Monetary System?
Central bank: China currency swap deals surpass 3t yuan.
The International Lender of Last Resort for Emerging Countries: A Bilateral Currency Swap?
Camila Villard Duran.
Entry of yuan into SDR may give a boost to global liquidity.
Redback Rising: China’s Bilateral Swap Agreements and RMB Internationalization.
Daniel E. McDowell.
International reserves and swap lines: substitutes or complements?
Yothin Jinjarak, Donghyun Park.
The Asian Monetary Fund Reborn? Implications of Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization.
William W. Grimes.
Avoiding the next liquidity crunch: how the G20 must support monetary cooperation to increase resilience to crisis.
Camila Villard Duran.
Stitching together the global financial safety net.
Edd Denbee, Carsten Jung and Francesco Paternò.
Why Are There Large Foreign Exchange Reserves? The Case of South Korea.
Federal Reserve Policy in an International Context.
The dollar’s international role: An “exorbitant privilege”?
Thursday, January 7, 2016.
TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT REPORT, 2015.
Making the international financial architecture work for development.
Global Economic Governance in Asia: Through the Looking Glass of the European Sovereign Debt Crisis.
China in Global Financial Governance: Implications from Regional Leadership Challenge in East Asia.
Central Bank Currency Swaps Key to International Monetary System.
The Federal Reserve’s Foreign Exchange Swap Lines.
Michael J. Fleming and Nicholas J. Klagge.
Central Bank Liquidity Swaps.
Central Bank Dollar Swap Lines and Overseas Dollar Funding Costs.
Linda S. Goldberg, Craig Kennedy, and Jason Miu.
eXperience With foreign currency liquidity-providing centrAl bAnK sWAps.
Banking on China through Currency Swap Agreements.
October 23, 2015.
TESTING THE GLOBAL CENTRAL BANK SWAP NETWORK.
The impact of international swap lines on stock returns of banks in emerging markets.
Alin Marius Andries1 Andreas M. Fischer2 Pınar Ye ̧sin.
Why Did the US Federal Reserve Unprecedentedly Offer Swap Lines to Emerging Market Economies during the Global Financial Crisis? Can We Expect Them Again in the Future?
International reserves and swap lines: substitutes or complements?
Yothin Jinjarak, Donghyun Park.
Central Bank Dollar Swap Lines and Overseas Dollar Funding Costs.
Linda S. Goldberg Craig Kennedy Jason Miu.
Central Bank Liquidity Swaps.
Central bank currency swaps key to international monetary system.
Author: Andrew Sheng, Fung Global Institute.
Evaluating Asian Swap Arrangements.
Joshua Aizenman, Yothin Jinjarak, and Donghyun Park.
No. 297 July 2011.
Central Bank Liquidity Swaps Overview.
February 15, 2010.
The implications of cross-border banking and foreign currency swap lines for the international monetary system.
The Politics of Rescuing the World’s Financial System: The Federal Reserve as a Global Lender of Last Resort.
J. Lawrence Broz.
From Exorbitant Privilege to Existential Trilemma.
The dollar is now everyone’s problem.
September 29, 2014.
The Global Dollar System.
Stephen G Cecchetti.
Central Bank Swaps and International Dollar Illiquidity.
Andrew K. Rose Mark M. Spiegel∗
DOLLAR FUNDING AND THE LENDING BEHAVIOR OF GLOBAL BANKS.
VICTORIA IVASHINA DAVID S. SCHARFSTEIN JEREMY C. STEIN.
First draft: October 2012 This draft: March 2015.
THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE RENMINBI AND THE RISE OF A MULTIPOLAR CURRENCY SYSTEM.
By Miriam Campanella.
Dollar Illiquidity and Central Bank Swap Arrangements During the Global Financial Crisis.
Andrew K. Rose Mark M. Spiegel.
Central Bank Dollar Swap Lines and Overseas Dollar Funding Costs.
Linda S. Goldberg, Craig Kennedy, Jason Miu.
US Dollar Swap Arrangements between Central Banks.
Currency Swaps with Foreign Central Banks.
BY RENEE COURTOIS.
Central Banks Make Swaps Permanent as Crisis Backstop.
October 31, 2013.
Swap Lines Underscore the Dollar’s Global Role.
Central bank co-operation and international liquidity in the financial crisis of 2008-9.
by William A Allen and Richhild Moessner.
Monetary and Economic Department.
Financial instability, Reserves, and Central Bank Swap Lines in the Panic of 2008.
Maurice Obstfeld Jay C. Shambaugh Alan M. Taylor.
The Federal Reserve as Global Lender of Last Resort, 2007-2010.
J. Lawrence Broz.
Lenders of Last Resort and Global Liquidity.
Rethinking the system.
The Fed’s FX swap facilities have been quiet… too quiet?
Swap Lines Underscore the Dollar’s Global Role.
THE EVOLUTION OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SWAP LINES SINCE 1962.
Michael D. Bordo Owen F. Humpage Anna J. Schwartz.
How China Covered The World In “Liquidity Swap Lines”
The Federal Reserve’s Foreign Exchange Swap Lines.
Michael J. Fleming Nicholas Klagge.
The Federal Reserve as Global Lender of Last Resort, 2007-2010.
J. Lawrence Broz.
The Fed’s Role in International Crises.
Thursday, September 18, 2014.
Options for meeting the demand for international liquidity during financial crises.
The Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization: Origin, Development and Outlook.
No. 230 July 2010.
The Amended Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation (CMIM) Comes Into Effect on July 17, 2014.
Note on Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM)*
SOURCES AND EVOLUTION OF THE CHIANG MAI INITIATIVE.
The Chiang Mai Initiative.
Embedded Domestic Preferences and Internationally Nested Constraints in Regional Institution Building in East Asia**
From the Chiang Mai Initiative to an Asian Monetary Fund.
No. 527 May 2015.
Asian Monetary Fund: Getting Nearer.
By Pradumna B. Rana.
Panel on Financial Affairs Meeting on 2 November 2009.
on Hong Kong’s participation in Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization.
The Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation: Origin, Development and Outlook.
Much Ado about Nothing? Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation and East Asian Exchange Rate Cooperation.
Financial Safety Nets in Asia: Genesis, Evolution, Adequacy, and Way Forward.
Hal Hill and Jayant Menon.
Financial Community Building in East Asia.
The Chiang Mai Initiative: Its Causes and Evaluation.
EPIK 2010 Economics of Community Building.
FROM “TAOGUANG YANGHUI” TO “YOUSUO ZUOWEI”:
CHINA’S ENGAGEMENT IN FINANCIAL MINILATERALISM.
Foundation of Regional Integration: Common or Divergent Interests?
CMIM and ESM: ASEAN+3 and Eurozone Crisis Management and Resolution Liquidity Provision in Comparative Perspective.
Ramon PACHECO PARDO.
An Overview of Regional Financial Cooperation: Implication for BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement.
CMIM-Asian Multilateralism and Cooperation.
Keynote speech by Dr. Junhong Chang, AMRO Director, at the 6th Asia Research Forum.
Financial RegionaliSm: a Review oF the iSSueS.
Practices of Financial Regionalism and the Negotiation of Community in East Asia.
Financial Integration in Emerging Asian Economies.
Regional Monetary Cooperation: Lessons from the Euro Crisis for Developing Areas?
The Need and Scope for Strengthening Co-operation Between Regional Financing Arrangements and the IMF.
Towards institutionalization: The BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA)
The BRICS Contingent Reserve Arrangement and its Position.
in the Emerging Global Financial Architecture.
NIColETTE CATTANEo, MAyAMIko BIzIwICk & DAvID FRyER.
Financial Architectures and Development:
Resilience, Policy Space and Human Development in the Global South.
by Ilene Grabel.
Financial Regionalism in East Asia.
Enhancing the Effectiveness of CMIM and AMRO: Selected Immediate Challenges and Tasks.
Reza Siregar and Akkharaphol Chabchitrchaidol.
No. 403 January 2013.
Regional and Global Liquidity Arrangements.
Ulrich Volz / Aldo Caliari (Editors)
A regional reserve fund for Latin America.
Daniel Titelman, Cecilia Vera, Pablo Carvallo and Esteban Pérez Caldentey.
Financial Crises as Catalysts for Regional Integration? The Chances and Obstacles for Monetary Integration in ASEAN+3 and MERCOSUR.
Sebastian Krapohl Daniel Rempe.
Framework of the ASEAN Plus Three Mechanisms Operating in the Sphere of Economic Cooperation.
Prof. Dr. Vyacheslav V. Gavrilov.
Regional Integration in Europe and East Asia: Experiences of Integration and Lessons from Functional Multilateralism.
General Overview: “Financial Risk and Crisis Management after the Global Financial Crisis”
Remaking the architecture: the emerging powers, self-insuring and regional insulation.
The Origins and Transformation of East Asian Financial Regionalism.
Regional Financial Arrangement: An Impetus for Regional Policy Cooperation.
Reza Siregar and Keita Miyaki.
Role of Regional Institutions in East Asia.
Asia’s new financial safety net: Is the Chiang Mai Initiative designed not to be used?
Hal Hill, Jayant Menon.
Will the new BRICS institutions work?
BRICS NEW DEVELOPMENT BANK AND CONTINGENT RESERVE ARRANGEMENT.
The Contingent Reserve Arrangement and the International Monetary System.
The BRICS Bank and Reserve Arrangement: towards a new global financial framework?
China’s Bilateral Currency Swap Lines.
Lin Zhitao Zhan Wenjie Yin-Wong Cheung.
CESIFO WORKING PAPER NO. 5736 CATEGORY 7:MONETARY POLICY AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCE JANUARY 2016.
Elasticity and Discipline in the Global Swap Network.
Perry Mehrling Barnard College and INET.
6 de novembro de 2015.
A Proposal for a New Regional Financial Arrangement: The Reserve Liquidity Line.
International Liquidity in a Multipolar World.
International Liquidity Swaps: Is the Chiang Mai Initiative Pooling Reserves Efficiently ?
Emanuel Kohlscheen and Mark P. Tayl.
International Reserves and Swap Lines in Times of Financial Distress: Overview and Interpretations.
No. 192 February 2010.
Coordinating Regional and Multilateral Financial Institutions.
C. Randall Henning.
The Asian Monetary Fund Reborn? Implications of Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization.
William W. Grimes.
REGIONAL LIQUIDITY MECHANISMS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES.
Gustavo Rojas de Cerqueira César.
Much Ado about Nothing? Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralisation and East Asian Exchange Rate Cooperation.
Global Liquidity: Public and Private.
Safety for whom? The scattered global financial safety net and the role of regional financial arrangements.
Mühlich, Laurissa; Fritz, Barbara.
The International Financial Architecture and the Role of Regional Funds.
The evolving multi-layered global financial safety net : role of Asia.
Pradumna B. Rana.
The decentralised global monetary system requires an efficient safety net.
Asian Regional Financial Safety Nets? Don’t Hold Your Breath.
STITCHING TOGETHER THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SAFETY NET.
Deputy Governor, Bank of England.
26 de fevereiro de 2016.
The Global Financial Safety Net through the Prism of G20 Summits.
Mecanismo Europeu de Estabilidade.
ADEQUACY OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL SAFETY NET.
Pradumna B. Rana.
The Global Liquidity Safety Net.
Institutional Cooperation on Precautionary Facilities and Central Bank Swaps.
Inadequate Regional Financial Safety Nets Reflect Complacency.
No. 411 March 2013.
Stitching together the global financial safety net.
by Edd Denbee, Carsten Jung and Francesco Paternò.
GLOBAL AND REGIONAL FINANCIAL SAFETY NETS: LESSONS FROM EUROPE AND ASIA.
CHANGYONG RHEE, LEA SUMULONG AND SHAHIN VALLÉE.
Financial Safety Nets in Asia: Genesis, Evolution, Adequacy, and Way Forward.
Hal Hill and Jayant Menon.
No. 395 November 2012.
Beatrice Scheubel, Livio Stracca.
04 October 2016.
Global Financial Safety Nets: Where Do We Go from Here?
Eduardo Levy Levy-Yeyati.
How can countries cooperate to mitigate contagion and limit the spread of crises? 7 de novembro de 2011.
What do we know about the global financial safety net? Rationale, data and possible evolution.
Cross Border/Offshore Payment and Settlement Systems.
Cross Border/Offshore Payment and Settlement Systems.
There are several ways by which international payment transactions are done around the globe.
Main mechanisms for payment and settlements are as follows:
Correspondent Banks Network – loosely coupled network of private banks. Clearing Bank Model - using international clearing banks – China’s RMB Clearing Banks Cross border RTGS – used mainly in regional economic and monetary blocs such as EMU – TARGET2. Clearing House model – Offshore Payment, Clearing, and settlements through systems such CHIPS in USA and CIPS in China.
Central Banks also have created a Currency Swap network for providing liquidity in international financial markets.
Recently, there has been a decline in correspondent banks network transactions. Many global banks have withdrawn correspondent relationships with other banks due to increased regulations.
There is also a newer trend in using ACH networks for international transactions. SEPA in Europe and FedGlobal ACH in USA are two examples.
SWIFT and CLS bank also play a critical role in international payments.
There is also very large OTC FX market in which 5.1 trillion USD per day are traded. I am not yet sure about the clearing and settlements of these transactions.
There are some newer technology platforms which have started providing Global payment services. Earthport in UK and Ripple Labs are two such examples.
Large Value Transfer Methods (B2B Transfers)
Cross border, Same Currency – TARGET2, SEPA, EURO1 Offshore, currency specific – CHIPS for USD, CIPS for RMB Cross border, multiple currencies – SWIFT, CLS Offshore Clearing Houses – Hong Kong, Singapore, London, Japan, Frankfurt, USA OTC FX markets (FX SWAPS, FX SPOT, FX Forward, FX Futures) Network of Correspondent Banks Network of Clearing Houses CB FX Swap Network Intra bank payment networks: Multinational Banks (Branch or subsidiary in a foreign country) FEDGlobal ACH Hawala System.
Regional Blocs (where new RTGS are being developed)
East Africa Community (EAC) West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) Common Market for East and South Africa (COMESA) South African Development Community (SADC) – SIRESS RTGS Automated Clearing House in Common Monetary Area (CMA) ASEAN AEC ? South Asian (Asian Clearing Union) ?
LVPS used for International Payments.
EURO1 ( Pan Europe) euroSIC (Frankfurt) used for Euro transactions between countries in EU but not in EMU. FXYCS (Japan) EAF (Germany) SIC (Switzerland) CHIPS ( USA) CHAPS (UK) LVTS (Canada) CIPS (China)
I am not sure how many of these networks are currently operational since countries in EU have migrated to TARGET2 since 2008.
G-LVTN (Global Large Value Transfer Networks)
There are several newer solutions for international payment and money remittances at retail level. B2C and C2C international money transfers. They are listed here along with old solutions but are not discussed in this post.
New and Old Solutions (Retail B2C, C2C)
Block chain Ripple Earthport Transferwise Xoom (A Paypal service) Paypal Bitcoins Western Union (Old) MoneyGram (Old) Money2India/ICICI Bank State Bank of India Global ACH with FX Conversion International ACH Transactions.
One of the main reasons for this discrepancy is the inadequacy of the infrastructure for cross-border renminbi payments. Cross-border payments are currently made via a patchwork of clearing hubs and correspondent banks. These payments are hindered by complicated routing procedures, the need to maintain multiple foreign correspondent accounts, liquidity shortages in some offshore RMB centers, different hours of operations between clearing centers, a lack of common standards between international and Chinese domestic payment systems, and China’s capital controls.
Despite these hurdles, the use of the renminbi as an international payments currency has continued to grow rapidly. In the first half of 2015, there were more than RMB 5.7 trillion (USD 866.7 billion) worth of payments made to and from China using the renminbi. Currently, around a third of payments between China and the Asia Pacific region are conducted using renminbi. These numbers are projected to increase substantially over the coming years due to the desirability for Chinese businesses to use their own currency for trade transactions.
The increased use of the renminbi has led to around RMB1.5 trillion (USD 231 billion) in offshore renminbi deposits, with the largest amounts in Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore, respectively. As more renminbi accumulate outside of China, investors will increase their demands for channels to repatriate funds back onshore.
China’s Cross-border Inter-bank Payment System (CIPS) seeks to address many of the existing problems facing cross-border renminbi payments. CIPS provides one-point entry by participants and a central location for clearing renminbi payments It allows participation by both onshore and offshore banks and provides direct access to China National Advanced Payment System (CNAPS). These features reduce the need for banks to navigate complicated payment pathways via offshore clearing hubs or through correspondent banks. This should result in faster payment processing and reduced costs for cross-border payments.
CIPS is a real time gross settlement system, meaning that banks settle payments immediately between each other on a gross rather than a net basis. This reduces credit risks that can arise in systems where payments are netted before settlement.
Payment messages sent within CIPS are written in both English and Chinese. This eliminates the necessity of translating messages into Chinese before they can be transmitted to CNAPS. CIPS utilizes the ISO20022 messaging standard, a widely used international messaging scheme for cash, securities, trade and foreign exchange transactions. CIPS will also utilize SWIFT bank identifier codes, rather than CNAPS clearing codes. These factors will allow CIPS to smoothly process payments flowing between offshore banks using SWIFT and mainland banks using CNAPS. As a result, cross-border payments made through CIPS should be able to achieve straight through processing.
CIPS operating hours will extend from 9:00am to 8:00pm Shanghai-time. This allows the system to overlap with business hours in Europe, Africa, Oceania, and Asia. Banks within these jurisdictions will be able to settle renminbi transactions during their business day. Though North and South America are not currently covered, the People’s Bank of China (PBoC) has stated that an expansion of CIPS’ operating hours is possible.
As of the launch in October 2015, CIPS had 19 direct participants and 176 indirect participants. The initial direct members of CIPS include 11 Chinese banks and the Chinese subsidiaries of 8 foreign banks. There is currently only one American bank that is a direct participant in the system, Citibank. Of the indirect participants, 38 were Chinese banks and 138 are foreign banks.
Details on plans for the future development of CIPS are sparse. Chinese officials have spoken of a Phase II for CIPS that will improve liquidity management and the efficiency of cross-border clearing and settlement. PBoC officials have also stated that Phase II will include longer operating hours, support for securities settlement and central counterparties.
The creation of CIPS is an important milestone on the renminbi’s road to becoming a major global currency. It has the potential to significantly improve the efficiency of cross-border payment transactions and increase liquidity in the offshore market. CIPS provides a more direct pathway for processing transactions, improving speed and lowering fees. Liquidity in the offshore renminbi market will be improved due to the large number of participating financial institutions and the direct link the system has with CNAPS.
The fact that the renminbi has progressed so quickly despite the underlying deficiencies in the payments infrastructure is a testament to the global demand for the currency. CIPS seeks to rectify these deficiencies and is likely to play a critical role in the renminbi’s future growth as an international payments currency.
The Clearing House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS) is a bank-owned, privately operated electronic payments system.
CHIPS is both a customer and a competitor of the Federal Reserve’s Fedwire service.
The average daily value of CHIPS transactions is about $1.2 trillion a day.
The Clearing House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS) is an electronic payments system that transfers funds and settles transactions in U. S. dollars. CHIPS enables banks to transfer and settle international payments more quickly by replacing official bank checks with electronic bookkeeping entries. As of January 2002, CHIPS had 59 members, including large U. S. banks and U. S. branches of foreign banks.
The New York Clearing House Association, a group of the largest New York City commercial banks, organized CHIPS in 1970 for eight of its members with Federal Reserve System membership. Participation in CHIPS expanded gradually in the 1970s and 1980s to include other commercial banks, Edge corporations, United States agencies and branches of foreign banks, and other financial institutions.
Until 1981, final settlement, or the actual movement of balances at the Federal Reserve, occurred on the morning after a transfer. Sharply rising settlement volumes raised concerns that next-day settlement exposed funds unduly to various overnight and over-weekend risks. In August 1981, the Federal Reserve agreed to provide same-day settlement to CHIPS participants through Fedwire, the Fed’s electronic funds and securities transfer network.
The number of CHIPS members has fallen from about 140 in the late 1980s, mainly because of consolidations in the banking industry. Membership might have fallen even more sharply if CHIPS had not acted in 1998 to eliminate a requirement that members maintain an office in New York City.
CHIPS is governed by a ten-member board consisting of senior officers of large banks that establishes rules and fees and admits and reevaluates participants. CHIPS handles about 240,000 transactions a day with a total dollar value of about $1.2 trillion. Historically, CHIPS specialized in settling the dollar portion of foreign exchange transactions, and CHIPS estimates that it handles 95 percent of all U. S. dollar payments moving between countries. However, the CHIPS focus has shifted to domestic business since CHIPS introduced intraday settlement in January 2001.
Until January 2001, CHIPS conducted all of its settling at the end of the business day. Now, however, CHIPS provides intraday payment finality through a real-time system. CHIPS settles small payments, which can be accommodated by the banks’ available balances, individually. Other payments are netted bilaterally (e. g., when Bank A has to pay $500 million to Bank B, and Bank B has to pay $500 million to Bank A), without any actual movement of funds between CHIPS participants.
Other payments are netted multilaterally. Suppose Bank A must pay $500 million to Bank B, and Bank A is also expecting to receive $500 million from Bank C. Without netting, Bank A would send $500 million to Bank B, and it would thus experience a decline in its available cash while it was awaiting the payment from Bank C.
Using the CHIPS netting system, however, Bank A submits its $500 million payment for Bank B to a payments queue, where it waits until Bank C’s offsetting payment is received. The effect of matching and netting these payments is that Bank A’s cash position is simultaneously reduced by its payment to Bank B and increased by receipt of its payment from Bank C. The overall effect on Bank A’s cash position is thus zero.
Payments for which no match can be found are not made until the end of the day, but each payment is final as soon as it is made. To facilitate the working of the intraday netting system, each participant pre-funds its CHIPS account by depositing a certain amount between 12:30 and 9:00 a. m. The size of this “security deposit,” which is recalculated weekly, is set by CHIPS based on the number and size of the bank’s recent CHIPS transactions, and none of it can be withdrawn during the day. At the end of the day, CHIPS uses these deposits to settle any still-unsettled transactions. Any participant that has a negative closing position at the end of the day (that is, it owes more than what it has in its security deposit) has 30 minutes to make up the difference. The 30-minute period is referred to as the final prefunding period. If any banks do not meet their final prefunding requirement, CHIPS settles as many of the remaining payments as possible with funds that are in the system, and any payments still unsettled must be settled outside of CHIPS.
Banks that have positive closing positions at the end of the day receive the amounts that they are due in the form of Fedwire payments. Because the ultimate CHIPS settlements are provided by Fedwire, CHIPS is a customer, as well as a competitor, of Fedwire. The vast majority of CHIPS members are also Fedwire participants, and the daily value of CHIPS transfers is about 80 percent of Fedwire’s non-securities transfers.
CHIPS has recently added electronic data interchange (EDI) capability to its payment message format. EDI allows participants to transmit business information (such as the purpose of a payment) along with their electronic funds transfers.
USA FedGlobal ACH Payments.
To facilitate this mapping process, the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta joined with U. S. and foreign depository institutions, international clearing and settlement service providers, and other interested parties to form the International Payments Framework Association (IPFA). The IPFA is a nonprofit membership association comprising 29 members representing Brazil, Canada, Europe, Japan, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States whose purpose is to create a framework for bridging national formats for non-urgent international credit transfers. IPFA establishes rules, standards, and operating procedures for the exchange of these payments. The first effort by IPFA was to create rules that would facilitate a bridge between the IAT format for ACH credit transfers and the payment format, ISO 20022, which supports the several retail networks within the single euro payments area (also known as SEPA), under the SEPA credit transfer scheme. The next step underway is to leverage the framework created for the United States and SEPA in order to add other countries—such as Brazil, Canada, and South Africa—that want to exchange payments with the United States or SEPA ACH networks.
The Reserve Banks, through FedGlobal, launched their first commercial international ACH service with Canada in 1999.43 The service began as a pilot program for outbound commercial ACH transfers from the United States to Canada and became a production service in December 2001. Subsequent to the Canadian service, the Reserve Banks launched individual services to Europe, Mexico, Panama, and Latin America, covering 34 countries in total.44 In 2010, the Reserve Banks processed 1.3 million international ACH transfers—accounting for about 20 percent of the total volume of international payments being cleared and settled through the U. S. ACH network.45.
The Reserve Banks offer FedGlobal account-to-account services to Canada, Mexico, Panama, and 22 countries in Europe. The Reserve Banks offer FedGlobal A2R services to Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Peru, and Uruguay.
Europe Cross Border LVPS.
Target 2 Euro1 SEPA CLS/SWIFT STEP 2 STEP 1.
EU EBA Clearing – EURO1, STEP1, STEP2, MyBank.
EBA Clearing is a provider of pan-European payment infrastructure with headquarters in Paris. It is wholly owned by its shareholders.
Its initial mission consisted in the operation of the clearing and settlement system for single euro transactions of high value EURO1, which the Euro Banking Association (EBA) had transferred to EBA Clearing for the launch of the system in 1999. Besides EURO1, EBA Clearing also owns and operates STEP1, a payment system for single euro payments for small and medium-sized banks, and STEP2, a Pan-European Automated Clearing House (PE-ACH) for euro retail payments. In March 2013, EBA CLEARING launched MyBank, an e-authorisation solution for online payments, which is geared at facilitating the growth of e-commerce across Europe.[1]
Both EURO1 and STEP2 have been identified as Systemically Important Payment Systems (SIPS) by the European Central Bank (ECB). EBA CLEARING is also planning to deliver a pan-European instant payments infrastructure solution in the course of 2017.
The organisation is based in Paris and has representative offices in Brussels, Frankfurt and Milan.
EURO1 is a RTGS-equivalent large-value payment system on a multilateral net basis, for single euro transactions of high priority and urgency, and primarily of large amount. EURO1 is owned and operated by EBA CLEARING. It is open to banks that have a registered address or branch in the European Union and fulfil a number of additional requirements. EURO1 is subject to German law (current account principle/single obligation structure) and is based on a messaging and IT infrastructure provided by SWIFT.
Since 2000, EBA CLEARING has been offering a payment service named STEP1 for small and medium-sized banks for single euro payments of high priority and urgency. The technical infrastructure is the same as that of the EURO1 system, both use the messaging and IT infrastructure of SWIFT.
STEP2 was put into operation in 2003 with Italian payment system provider SIA S. p.A. It processes mass payments in euro. STEP2 is a Pan-European Automated Clearing House (PE-ACH). This means that it complies with the principles set by the European Payments Council (EPC) for a PE-ACH Compliant Clearing and Settlement System.
From the beginning of Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA) on 28 January 2008, STEP2 has been offering SEPA Credit Transfer processing services across all SEPA countries through its SEPA Credit Transfer (SCT) Service. Since 2 November 2009, the transposition date of the Payment Services Directive, EBA CLEARING has been processing SEPA Direct Debits with its STEP2 SDD Core and STEP2 SEPA Direct Debit (“Business to Business”) Services. Through its SEPA Credit Transfer and Direct Debit offerings, STEP2 provides banks across Europe with one channel through which they can send and receive their SEPA Credit Transfers and SEPA Direct Debits. The STEP2 platform reaches nearly 100 percent of all banks that have signed the SCT and SDD Scheme Adherence Agreements of the European Payments Council (EPC).
MyBank is a pan-European e-authorisation solution for online payments that was launched in March 2013 by EBA CLEARING. The solution enables customers across Europe to pay for their online purchases via their regular online or mobile banking environment without having to disclose confidential data to the merchant or other third parties. The solution can be used for authorising SEPA Credit Transfers as well as the creation of SDD mandates. At a later stage, MyBank may also be used for transactions in currencies other than euro or for e-identity services.
Today, MyBank is owned and managed by PRETA S. A.S., a wholly owned subsidiary of EBA CLEARING.[2]
ECB identifies systemically important payments systems.
Four systems were identified: TARGET2, EURO1, STEP2-T and CORE(FR);
Goal is to ensure efficient management of risks and sound governance arrangements.
The European Central Bank (ECB) has identified four key payment systems that are now under the new ECB Regulation on oversight requirements for systemically important payment systems (SIPS), which entered into force on 12 August 2014. The regulation covers large-value and retail payment systems in the euro area operated by both central banks and private entities, and aims at ensuring efficient management of legal, credit, liquidity, operational, general business, custody, investment and other risks as well as sound governance arrangements, namely with a view towards promoting the smooth operation of safe and efficient payment systems in the euro area.
The four systems identified today are: TARGET2, operated by the Eurosystem; EURO1 and STEP2-T, operated by EBA CLEARING; and CORE(FR), operated by STET, a joint initiative of six major French banks. They were identified according to the combination of at least two of four main criteria, i. e. the value of payments settled, market share, cross-border relevance and provision of services to other infrastructures. The Eurosystem will review this list annually on the basis of updated statistical data.
From CLS Bank & o World of FX Settlement.
Começar minha carreira como trader em Wall Street, um dos grandes mistérios que tive, foi como todos esses negócios na NYSE foram executados e reportados. Dentro do labirinto de estandes especializados e papel de vôo, os negócios estavam sendo cruzados e os compradores e vendedores eram reconhecidos. Embora os erros ocasionais ocorram, o sistema selvagem é altamente eficiente em reportar e liquidar transações.
No mundo da OTC, a liquidação representa um fator maior, já que os participantes não estão vinculados a um sistema de câmbio central que garante o risco de contraparte. Como tal, as empresas estão por conta própria para garantir que os negócios sejam liquidados corretamente com suas contrapartes e que ocorra uma troca de fundos.
No Relatório do Setor do 1º trimestre de 2013 da Forex Magnates, analisamos o mundo do fluxo de liquidação e pós-negociação de FX e pesquisamos o CLS Bank e Traiana. Queríamos saber exatamente o que eles faziam e como seus produtos ajudam os agentes de FX a lidar com suas necessidades de estabelecimento, criar mercados eficientes e reduzir os custos gerais de transação. Nesta primeira parte, nos concentramos no CLS Bank.
Lançado em 2002, o CLS Bank foi criado como uma iniciativa do setor privado para fornecer e operar serviços para mitigar o risco de liquidação no mercado de câmbio. De propriedade e operados por instituições membros e trabalhando ao lado de bancos centrais, o CLS oferece aos membros a capacidade de liquidar transações dentro de um local central, proporcionando, assim, eficiência aos mercados de câmbio.
Para entender o que o CLS faz, é importante primeiro saber como a liquidação funciona. Liquidação é o processo no qual o pagamento e os títulos de uma transação são entregues. Dentro do mundo dos valores mobiliários, isso ocorre em uma janela de três dias. Por exemplo, se um trader comprar 100 ações da IBM a US $ 100 / ação, o corretor terá três dias para coletar US $ 10.000 do cliente, transferi-lo para o vendedor e coletar as ações de volta para o cliente.
Dentro do FX, a liquidação não envolve títulos, mas sim moedas diferentes. Portanto, em um comércio de EUR / USD, o vendedor envia dólares enquanto recebe euros. Para participantes de OTC, uma das maiores preocupações é o risco de liquidação, que ocorre quando uma contraparte é incapaz ou não deseja fornecer o pagamento ou a transferência de títulos.
Enquanto um acordo entre duas partes pode ser facilmente anulado, limitando assim o impacto de uma contraparte problemática, a maior preocupação é o risco sistêmico. Como os negociadores negociam simultaneamente com várias partes, se uma das partes não honrar uma transação, ela pode afetar as contrapartes e impedir que elas tenham os fundos e / ou títulos para liquidar outras transações.
Jake Smith, Chefe de Comunicações da CLS, explicou que “o risco de liquidação de câmbio também é conhecido como 'Herstatt Risk'”. O nome é derivado do fracasso de um banco alemão de propriedade privada em 1974. Na época, Bankhaus Herstatt havia recebido entrega de marcos alemães de bancos de contrapartes dos EUA, mas foi colocado em concordata antes do envio dos dólares correspondentes, devido ao tempo Smith explicou que, embora isso tenha ocorrido há quase 40 anos, “devido ao crescimento substancial dos volumes desde então, o risco de liquidação cresceu significativamente”.
Para atenuar esse risco, o CLS foi criado. Atualmente, existem mais de 60 membros, que representam algumas das maiores instituições financeiras de todo o mundo. O CLS fornece uma rede de liquidação central para transações de câmbio entre seus membros e seus clientes. Para facilitar a liquidação, todos os membros devem ter uma única conta em várias moedas com o CLS, suportando as 17 moedas liquidadas por seu sistema.
Após a realização de uma negociação, os membros enviam detalhes transacionais para o CLS Bank, incluindo detalhes da transação, contrapartes e dados de liquidação. No dia da liquidação, o CLS Bank faz a leitura multilateral de todas as instruções entre os membros do acordo, calculando as obrigações de pagamento de cada instituição durante o dia, para garantir a liquidação de todas as suas instruções com base no pagamento versus pagamento. À medida que o acordo for concluído, o pagamento de balanços longos com liquidação múltipla lateral ocorrerá.
Example: GBP/USD = 1.50, EUR/USD = 1.25.
Membro 1: Compra 1.000.000 GBP / USD do Membro 2.
Membro 2: Compra 1.000.000 EUR / USD do Membro 3.
Membro 3: Compra 1.000.000 GBP / USD do Membro 1.
Membro 1: Owes 1,5M USD & amp; 1M GBP, recolhe 1,5M USD & amp; 1M de GBP.
Membro 2: Owes 1.25M USD & amp; 1M GBP, recolhe 1M EUR & amp; 1,5 USD.
Membro 3: Owes 1.5M USD & amp; 1M EUR, recolhe 1,25M USD & amp; 1M de GBP.
O CLS, em seguida, multi-lateralmente redes o total de obrigações:
Membro 1: paga 0,0.
Membro 2: paga 1 milhão de libras esterlinas.
Membro 3: paga 0,25M USD & amp; 1 milhão de euros.
Estas obrigações são financiadas na respectiva conta multi-moeda do membro.
O CLS então redistribui as obrigações para os membros correspondentes.
Membro 1: recebe 0,0.
Membro 2: recebe 1 milhão de euros & amp; 0,25M USD.
Membro 3: recebe 1 milhão de libras esterlinas.
Por meio de obrigações de pagamento multi-lateralmente compensatórias (também conhecidas como compressão comercial) para cada moeda, o CLS elimina a necessidade de financiar negociações numa base individual por moeda, resultando em uma eficiência de compensação de aproximadamente 96%. Isso aumenta para 99% com In / Out Swaps (um In / Out Swap é um swap intraday consistindo de duas transações FX iguais e opostas).
Isso significa que, para cada US $ 1 trilhão de swaps de entrada / saída liquidados, os membros precisam fornecer financiamento para menos de US $ 10 bilhões e US $ 40 milhões para câmbio à vista. Com o CLS gerenciando quase US $ 5 trilhões em liquidações diárias, as taxas de compensação são um elemento-chave para permitir que as empresas aumentem seus volumes transacionais, ao mesmo tempo reduzindo substancialmente o volume de financiamento necessário. Segundo Smith, “o CLS acredita que este processo mais seguro e eficiente é um dos fatores que levaram ao aumento do volume de FX nos últimos 10 anos”.
Smith explicou que o CLS oferece vários benefícios para o setor de FX, incluindo mitigação de risco de liquidação, compensação multilateral, eficiência operacional e de TI, oportunidades de crescimento de negócios e capacidade de desenvolver melhores práticas, padrões e regras comuns que beneficiam o mercado de FX.
Dentro da mitigação de risco de liquidação, também vem o reconhecimento de crédito. Por serem membros do CLS, os departamentos de crédito têm uma maior compreensão mútua e do risco de contraparte. Isso permite que as empresas aloquem menos risco entre negociações para outros membros. Por exemplo, enquanto um banco pode decidir negociar até US $ 10 bilhões com outro membro, é mais provável que ele limite sua exposição comercial a não-membros.
Em termos de eficiência operacional, um fator-chave é em relação à regra e ao comitê de supervisão do CLS. Tendo um conjunto de diretrizes para membros e bancos centrais, fornece a todos os participantes uma compreensão mais clara de suas contrapartes. Ao adicionar uma nova moeda, o banco central correspondente precisa seguir as diretrizes padronizadas. Essas regras fornecem proteção para os membros que se beneficiam da maior transparência que um banco central participante precisará seguir.
Em julho de 2012, o papel crítico que o CLS desempenha nos mercados financeiros globais foi reconhecido pelo Conselho de Supervisão da Estabilidade Financeira do Departamento do Tesouro dos EUA, quando designou o CLS como uma Utilidade do Mercado Financeiro (FMU) sistemicamente importante. A importância do CLS foi destacada ainda mais em novembro de 2012, com o anúncio da isenção do Departamento do Tesouro dos EUA de swaps cambiais e encaminhamentos dos requisitos de compensação exigidos para muitos produtos financeiros sob a legislação de Dodd-Frank. O papel que o CLS desempenha na mitigação do risco de liquidação cambial acreditava-se ser um fator contribuinte para essa decisão.
O aumento do investimento do CLS em tecnologia permitiu que ele expandisse materialmente a capacidade de pico à medida que atualizava as principais tecnologias, para atender aos elevados padrões exigidos de uma UMF sistemicamente importante. O resultado é que o CLS agora pode acomodar volumes de correspondência comercial de até cinco vezes o volume médio diário e processar 20% do volume de um dia de pico em um período de uma hora.
Além disso, o CLS implementou uma infraestrutura de tecnologia flexível, que permite a “capacidade sob demanda”, suportando futuras atualizações de software a fim de aumentar a capacidade em questão de dias e semanas. Essa estrutura permite que o CLS pague pela tecnologia somente quando necessário, enquanto cumpre as obrigações com o mercado para liquidar todas as instruções de liquidação de câmbio elegíveis.
A necessidade de capacitação foi demonstrada em 22 de janeiro de 2013, quando o CLS liquidou mais de 2,6 milhões de instruções, 18% a mais do que a alta anterior, registrada em 19 de setembro de 2012.
Olhando para o futuro, à medida que os mercados emergentes crescem, o CLS recebeu juros dos membros da liquidação para incluir moedas adicionais. Como tal, o CLS vem avaliando a adição do real brasileiro, peso chileno, renminbi chinês, rublo russo e baht tailandês, entre outros.
Outra área em que o CLS está estendendo seus serviços é a liquidação no mesmo dia. Uma porcentagem significativa de negociações de USD / CAD é intra-dia e não está atualmente incluída na liquidação do CLS, devido à hora do dia. O CLS está desenvolvendo um serviço de liquidação no mesmo dia entre dólares americanos e canadenses para lidar com esse risco de liquidação, que tem uma data de lançamento proposta para o final de 2013.
From The complexity of correspondent banking.
Correspondent Banking Network.
Correspondent banking, which can be broadly defined as the provision of banking services by one bank (the “correspondent bank”) to another bank (the “respondent bank”), is essential for customer payments, especially across borders, and for the access of banks themselves to foreign financial systems. The ability to make and receive international payments via correspondent banking is vital for businesses and individuals, and for the G20’s goal of strong, sustainable, balanced growth. At the extreme, if an individual bank loses access to correspondent banking services, this may affect its viability and if a country’s banks more generally face restricted access then it may affect the functioning of the local banking system. In addition, loss of correspondent banking services can create financial exclusion, particularly where it affects flows such as remittances which are a key source of funds for people in many developing countries.
Banks have traditionally maintained broad networks of correspondent banking relationships, but there are growing indications that this situation might be changing. In particular, some banks providing these services are reducing the number of relationships they maintain and are establishing few new ones. The impact of this trend is uneven across jurisdictions and banks. As a result, some respondent banks are likely to maintain relationships, whereas others might risk being cut off from international payment networks. This implies a threat that cross-border payment networks might fragment and that the range of available options for these transactions could narrow.
Rising costs and uncertainty about how far customer due diligence should go in order to ensure regulatory compliance (ie to what extent banks need to know their customers’ customers – the so-called “KYCC”-) are cited by banks as among the main reasons for cutting back their correspondent relationships. To avoid penalties and the related reputational damage correspondent banks have developed an increased sensitivity to the risks associated with correspondent banking. As a consequence, they have cut back services for respondent banks that (i) do not generate sufficient volumes to overcome compliance costs; (ii) are located in jurisdictions perceived as very risky; or (iii) provide payment services to customers about which the necessary information for an adequate risk assessment is not available.
The regulatory framework, and in particular the AML/CFT (Anti-Money Laundering/Counter Financing of Terrorism) requirements and the related implementing legislation and regulations in different jurisdictions, are taken as given in this report. It is acknowledged that these requirements, as agreed by the competent authorities, along with strict implementation, are necessary to prevent and detect criminal activities and ensure a healthy financial system.
From Redefining the Landscape of Payment Systems.
Regional Integration of Payment Systems.
Cross-border and cross-currency commercial and financial payments have traditionally been made through regional and global correspondent banking networks. Correspondent banking networks typically involve multiple levels of intermediation to link national payment systems. Similar arrangements exist for cross-border securities and other market-based transactions. Such decentralized, highly-tiered cross-border arrangements for payment and securities transfer, clearing and settlement involve substantial liquidity, operating and user costs. Moreover, the services provided are often too slow and unreliable for the rising volume of payments associated with closer regional commercial and financial ties. Consequently, more tightly organized and integrated regional and even inter-regional payment and securities infrastructures are developing as a result of integration initiatives in the African, Asian and Latin American regions, among others. The discussions around the theme of regional integration of systems extended even further to the need for harmonized development of central bank payment system and monetary policies.
Integration in Wholesale Systems.
The regional integration of national payment systems directly links the large-value payment systems of the participating countries. The link-up is through a distributed payment communications network involving either bilateral connectivity and system-to-system intra-regional payment settlement or connectivity to a central hub operating an intra-regional clearing and settlement facility. With large-value payment systems typically operated by national central banks, the distributed connectivity model of a regional payment system can substitute for the private correspondent banking network. The correspondent central banking arrangement concentrates intra-regional payments into a single central bank correspondent that participates in a network having more standardized service levels and agreements than the private system (i. e. correspondent banking). Over the medium-term, relative liquidity, operating and user costs should generally be lower and intra-regional payment settlement faster and more predictable than in the private system. A centralized model with a regional settlement bank can facilitate even greater standardization and more effective settlement risk control and, given a common settlement currency, permits multilateral netting that can lower liquidity costs even more as payment values and volumes rise.
The successful regional integration of national large-value payment systems does, however, require several pre-conditions. In addition to the obvious business case, the most critical pre-conditions are the harmonization of key institutional and structural elements in the national systems of the member countries and a sustainable commitment to the regional payment system, and the regional commercial and financial initiatives that underpin it. Experiences cited in a number of regional payment system initiatives indicate that unreasonable expectations of immediate pay-offs from integration and inadequate harmonization of key institutional elements during network expansion, such as those involving sound legal and oversight requirements, cause commitment to the project to waver and can sometimes cause the initiative to collapse. Organized and focused collaboration among all the key stakeholders and cooperation among the overseers of the national payment systems of the member countries is considered critical to sustaining commitment to the regional integration program.
Although several national securities depositories and securities settlement systems have developed bilateral system-to-system links in recent years, only a few have begun to integrate regionally or inter-regionally into an organized multilateral system. While the most developed cross-border systems are within the Eurozone, others have begun to develop elsewhere, as in the South African Development Community. The discussion concerning the role of CCPs in securities and derivatives settlement extended to consideration of regional, and even global, developments.
Integration of Retail Payment Systems.
Aside from the major global card payment systems, which are expanding their products and services into new payment applications for cross-border retail payments, there are only a few bilateral and multilateral system-to-system links that facilitate the clearing and settling of cross-border payments. Correspondent banking arrangements, even for the ultimate settlement of cross-border card payments, are still the primary network arrangements for the ultimate settlement of cross-border retail payments. The regional integration of large-value payment systems, in conjunction with the integration of retail and large-value payment systems at the national level, has spawned some initiatives for the regional integration of national retail payment systems. The SEPA (Single European Payment Area) initiative is perhaps the most ambitious of these integration initiatives. Triggered by policy action and driven by industry initiatives, SEPA is aimed at creating a single integrated market for retail payment instruments and services throughout the Eurozone. The most critical challenges faced by the SEPA initiative have been the set-up of public and private sector collaboration mechanisms for decision-making, user support from public sector administrations, and the harmonization of national legal barriers. SEPA-compliant credit and debit transfers are now in place and work is proceeding on the introduction of SEPA-compliant card payments and on the development of SEPA-based online and mobile payment channels.
Transnational Payment Systems.
While once there were only domestic payment channels in each country, we have witnessed the emergence of transnational systems such as TARGET, CLS (Continuous Linked Settlement), the Federal Reserve’s International ACH Project, known as FedACH International and the proposed pan-European automated clearinghouse known as PE-ACH. On the other end of the spectrum, card systems such as those operated by Visa and MasterCard are truly global in scope and have been expanding from consumer based transactions into commercial payments for more than a decade. Transnational systems have traditionally focused on providing payments within a region or to a small number of countries and usually support a single currency. Although none of these systems are yet global in scope, it is likely they will continue to expand their coverage to additional countries and currencies. Networks such as Visa and MasterCard are examples of global payment systems that also support multiple currencies, though they are primarily used for retail payments and ad hoc/T&E commercial transactions. Recently, in countries like Switzerland and Hong Kong13, new arrangements have been developed for the settlement of local payments in foreign currency. These arrangements neither fit perfectly in the traditional category of “correspondent banking” or in that of “payment systems”. The main common characteristic of these arrangements or systems is that they do not settle in central bank money but across accounts held with a commercial bank and that they are based on clearly defined and transparent rules for payment activities. Compared to traditional correspondent banking, these new solutions are standardized and settle payments in real time with continuous finality. In 1999, Swiss financial institutions established a cross-border solution in order to facilitate their cash management in euros. This solution involves a fully licensed bank in Germany, Swiss Euro Clearing Bank (SECB). To process euro transactions, SECB uses the euroSIC platform in Switzerland, which is often referred to as the euro payment system of Switzerland. EuroSIC is a replication of the Swiss franc RTGS system, Swiss Interbank Clearing (SIC). SIC and euroSIC are operated by Swiss Interbank Clearing AG. SECB is the settlement institution and shares the role of settlement agent with the operator SIC AG. SECB is also the liquidity provider in euroSIC. It extends intraday and overnight credit to the participants of euroSIC against collateral. SECB provides a link to the euro area, as it is a direct participant in RTGSPLUS through which access to TARGET is established. In Hong Kong, the U. S. dollar and euro clearing systems, USD CHATS (Clearing House Automated Transfer System) and Euro CHATS, were introduced in 2000 and 2003, respectively. They enhance the safety and efficiency of settling these foreign currencies in the local time zone. These systems are almost exact replicas of the Hong Kong dollar RTGS system (HKD CHATS). The key functions of both systems are to enable settlement of foreign exchange transactions between HK dollars, US dollars and euros in their respective currencies through a linkage with the Central Moneymarkets Unit (CMU) in Hong Kong.
The Hong Kong Monetary Authority has appointed the Hong Kong and Shanghai Banking Corporation as the settlement institution for USD CHATS and Standard Chartered Bank (Hong Kong) Limited as the settlement institution for Euro CHATS. Both institutions provide intraday liquidity to the direct participating banks by means of repos as well as overdraft facilities. One of the key benefits of both the US dollar and euro systems is the same day clearing of transactions. Also driving transnational systems is the implementation of “straight through processing (STP)” standards for transfers between banks as well as between banks and customers. To ensure simultaneous and dependable deliveries, payment-versus-payment (PVP), delivery-versus-payment (DVP), and delivery-versus-delivery (DVD) processes have also been established. The growth in transnational systems can improve the efficiency of cross-border payments by reducing clearing and settlement times, minimizing float. Better visibility of funds flows supports improved cash forecasting. Finally, standardized formats will reduce costly errors and repairs.
Intra bank Payments Networks – Multinational Banks.
Mergers and acquisitions have been the single biggest force reshaping the global payments landscape over the past two decades. The most recent round of consolidation has left a disparity between large and small never before seen. For example, we have witnessed the emergence of mega banks such as the combining of Bank of America and Nations Bank, as well as JP Morgan Chase combining Chase Manhattan Bank, Manufacturers Hanover Bank, Morgan Guaranty Trust and Bank One. In a scale-driven, technology-intensive business like payments, the emergence of true mega-players may lead to markedly different competitive dynamics. Acting as their own transnational systems, large international banks such as JP Morgan Chase, Citibank, Bank of America, and Hongkong Shanghai Banking Corporation operate their own internal global payments networks. Through these, they can route payments to destinations in different countries. Such internal networks do not necessarily differentiate between domestic and cross-border payments as these flows are all within the bank. The trend toward consolidation in the banking sector, both globally and in domestic markets, exerts influence on payment systems. Increased concentration of payment flows may have important credit, liquidity and operational risk implications. For example, the credit exposures that arise within a payments system that does not achieve intraday finality are likely to become concentrated on a smaller number of banks. Operational problems experienced by a single large bank could have significant repercussions for other participants in the system. A concentration of payment flows in commercial banks has emerged to reflect the increasing role that modern commercial banks, especially large global banks, have played in the payment systems around the world. The volumes and values settling across their books are, in some countries, quite substantial. Such traffic has often been accompanied by increased formalization of the correspondent relations within, as well as across, national boundaries. Banks that achieve global economies of scale can further drive down per transaction costs and derive higher revenues by keeping payments within their own networks. For global corporations, it has allowed them to match their global needs with a handful of banks rather than managing a large number of local relationships.
From The Inefficiencies of Cross-Border Payments: How Current Forces Are Shaping the Future.
A survey of major systems facilitating cross-border payments.
American Express : is a publicly traded company that issues charge and credit card products both directly and through nearly 100 financial institutions around the world. American Express had $484 billion in global sales in 2005.15.
CHAPS (Clearing House Automated Payment System) : CHAPS, established in 1984, is the United Kingdom’s high-value payment system, consisting of two systems: CHAPS Sterling and CHAPS Euro, which provide settlement facilities for sterling and euro payments, respectively. Over a dozen large banks and building societies are “direct” or settlement members, while there are also over 400 “indirect” members – typically smaller banks and building societies – who have access to the system through a settlement member.
CHIPS (Clearing House Interbank Payment System) : CHIPS is a bank-owned, privately operated, real-time, multilateral electronic payments system that transfers funds and settles transactions in U. S. dollars. CHIPS began operations in 1970 with 9 participating banks and, as of mid 2006, it processes about 300,000 payments a day with an average daily amount of $1.5 trillion. It currently has 46 participants from 19 countries around the world, including large U. S. banks and U. S. branches of foreign banks. The payments transferred over CHIPS are often related to international interbank transactions, including the payments resulting from foreign currency transactions (such as spot and currency swap contracts) and Euro placements and returns.
CLS (Continuous Linked Settlement) : The CLS system is the private sector response to a G-10 strategy to reduce foreign exchange settlement risk. CLS was founded in 1997 to create the first global settlement system, eliminating settlement risk in the foreign exchange market. Formed in response to regulatory concern related to the temporal and systemic risks (Herstatt risk) associated with foreign exchange transactions, CLS simultaneously settles both sides of foreign exchange trades using a multi-currency payment-versus-payment (PVP) mechanism. CLS is a unique real-time process enabling simultaneous foreign exchange settlement across the globe, eliminating the settlement risk caused by delays arising from time-zone differences. CLS settles well over $1 trillion per day, accounting for a substantial majority of cross-currency transactions across the globe.
Eurogiro : owned by 16 banks/postal financial service companies, is an electronic payment network for postal and giro (postbank) organizations that exchange cross-border credit transfers and cash-on-delivery orders. Established in 1989, Eurogiro has more than 40 participants from 37 countries in Europe, Asia, Africa, South America and the U. S. Members act as correspondents for one another and hold reciprocal accounts with each other to execute payments.
EURO1 : a private sector-owned high-value payment system, operated by the EBA Clearing Company for cross-border and domestic transactions in euro between banks operating in the European Union, and it is the largest of Europe’s four large-value, net settlement systems, processing on average 170,000 payments a day with a total value of about €170 billion. Launched in 1998, EURO1 was developed to provide an efficient, secure and cost-effective infrastructure for large-value payments in the new single currency environment of the EU. EURO1 is based on state-of-art messaging infrastructure and computing facilities supplied by SWIFT.
FedACH International Services : This international gateway arrangement service is owned and operated by the Federal Reserve System. Currently, the Federal Reserve Banks offer a suite of FedACH International Services as part of FedACH Services and provide U. S.- originating depository financial institutions with the ability to send international non-time-critical payments via the same process used to send domestic transactions for many decades. FedACH International Services offer an integrated, uncomplicated method to ensure straight-through processing (STP) of cross-border transactions, using NACHA formats that are supported by most software vendors.
Fedwire (Federal Reserve Wire Network) : This is a high-speed electronic network through which the U. S. Federal Reserve provides the Fedwire Funds Service, the Fedwire Securities Service, and the National Settlement Service. The Fedwire Funds Service provides an RTGS system in which more than 9,500 participants initiate funds transfers that are immediate, final, and irrevocable when processed.
LVTS (Large Value Transfer System) : The fully electronic LVTS, Canada’s real-time gross settlement system, became operational in early 1999. As Canada’s wire payment mechanism, it facilitates the electronic transfer of Canadian dollar payments across the country in real-time. Canada’s national payments system has been operated by the Canadian Payments Association (CPA) since 1980.
MasterCard : is a publicly-traded company that operates a global payment system. In addition to the MasterCard brand, the Maestro and Cirrus brands are also part of the company. MasterCard branded cards generated $1.7 trillion in global sales in 2005.16.
RTGSPLUS : is the German Bundesbank’s new liquidity-saving RTGS, which became operational in November 2001. It combines the risk-reducing benefits of gross settlement of the former German RTGS system known as the Euro Link System (ELS) with the advantages of liquidity-saving processing of the former hybrid system known as Euro Access Frankfurt (EAF).
SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications) : SWIFT is an industry-owned limited liability cooperative that supplies secure messaging services and interface software for financial transactions to more than 7,650 banks, securities brokers and investment managers in more than 200 countries.
SWIFT payment messages are processed by the Financial Information Network (FIN), which operates on a secure IP network called SWIFTNet. SWIFT is integrating into the ACH market segment as a payment service provider via its FileAct messaging service. ACH networks such as the EBA Clearing Company and the South African Automated Clearing Bureau are already using SWIFT’s messaging platform.
STEPS (Straight Through Euro Payment System) : The STEPS program was launched by the Euro Banking Association (EBA) to offer a full range of euro payments across Europe. STEPS has evolved into two systems aimed at accommodating a broad base of processing needs within the European Union: STEP1 (a pan-European system designed to process single cross-border, low-value retail payments) and STEP2 (a pan-European ACH for bulk/high volume, low-value, cross-border and domestic interbank payments).
STEP2 : a pan-European ACH solution, is a joint venture between the EBA and Italy’s ACH operator SIA. STEP2 processes high-volume, commercial and retail payment orders sent to the system via files through a secure network. Characteristics of payment orders that are processed via STEP2 are commercial and retail transfers in euro that are formatted to agreed technical standards. Accessible through SWIFTNet, STEP2 offers payment processing and settlement in euro.
TARGET (Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross Settlement Express Transfer) : The Eurosystem, which comprises the European Central Bank (ECB) and the national central banks (NCBs) of the 12 EU member states which have adopted the euro, has created TARGET for large-value payments in euro. The TARGET system is a “system of systems” composed of the national payment systems of 16 of 25 countries that are currently members of the EU, the ECB payment mechanism (EPM) and an interlinking mechanism that enables the processing of payments between the linked systems.
TARGET2 : The current structure of TARGET was decided on in 1994 and was based on the principles of minimum harmonization and interconnection of existing infrastructures. This was the best way of ensuring that the system would be operational from the very start of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999. TARGET2 is an enhanced version of the current TARGET incorporating technical consolidation, a single system-wide pricing structure for domestic and cross-border payments, a harmonized service level, and the system-wide pooling of available intraday liquidity. The go-live date for TARGET2 is set for November 19, 2007, with gradual migration to the new system by the member states in four waves. All central banks participating in TARGET2, together with their national banking communities, are expected to be using the new system by May 2008.
Visa : is a private, membership association jointly owned by more than 20,000 member financial institutions around the world. Visa develops common standards and specifications to facilitate commerce and provide member financial institutions with the global payment platform to support transactions on 1.46 billion cards that generate more than $4.3 trillion in global transactions in over 160 countries.17.
Voca : was formed in 1968 and was known as the “Bankers Automated Clearing System” or BACS which is similar to ACH in the US. BACS changed its name to Voca in 2004. Voca is one of a number of domestic ACH-type systems in Europe and owns the BACS infrastructure that processes the majority of non-RTGS, non-card, electronic credit and debit payments for B2C, C2B and B2B in the UK. VOCA performed 5 billion transactions in 2005. 28.
China’s Central Bank RMB Currency Swap Lines.
China’s Offshore RMB Clearing Centers.
Explaining cross-border large-value payment flows: Evidence from TARGET and EURO1 data.
Simonetta Rosati, Stefania Secola.
The Inefficiencies of Cross-Border Payments: How Current Forces Are Shaping the Future.
Written by Yoon S. Park, PHD & DBA, George Washington University.
There Is No Such Thing As An International Wire.
by ERIN MCCUNE on MAY 15, 2014.
The Elements of the Global Network for Large-Value Funds Transfers.
Cross-border RMB Settlements.
China launch of renminbi payments system reflects Swift spying concerns.
Possible RMB – Clearing model for the city of Frankfurt.
RMB Initiative Frankfurt Frankfurt, December 2013.
Working Group on the establishment of an RMB clearing house.
CIPS and the International Role of the Renminbi.
January 27, 2016.
By Nicholas Borst.
Correspondent banking July 2016.
Rethinking correspondent banking.
The complexity of correspondent banking.
CLS Bank & o World of FX Settlement.
Foreign exchange trading and settlement: Past and present.
by John W. McPartland, financial markets consultant.
Chicago Fed Letter 2006.
Settlement risk in foreign exchange markets and CLS Bank.
Cross-Border Payments Perspectives.
Research conducted by Glenbrook Partners.
Redefining the Landscape of Payment Systems.
Summary of Proceedings of the World Bank Conference.
Report to the Congress on the Use of the Automated Clearinghouse System for Remittance Transfers to Foreign Countries.
ESTABLISHING AN INTEGRATED PAYMENT SYSTEM.
(REAL-TIME GROSS SETTLEMENT) IN ASEAN.
A Proposal for a Cross-Border Mechanism to Support the AEC 2015.
PAYMENT SYSTEMS TO FACILITATE SOUTH ASIAN INTRA - REGIONAL TRADE.
Implementing Cross-border Payment, Clearing and Settlement Systems: Lessons from the Southern African Development Community.
Albert Mutonga Matongela.
The emerging single market in South-East Asia.
Payment System Interoperability and Oversight: The International Dimension.
Regional Monetary Co-operation in the Developing World Taking Stock.
Barbara Fritz / Laurissa Mühlich.
FRAMING A NEW ASIAN FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE.
Creating an Association of Southeast Asian Nations Payment System: Policy and Regulatory Issues.
Payments in ASEAN post AEC.
Regional Integration and Economic Development in South Asia.
Sultan Hafeez Rahman.
Towards South Asia Economic Union.
Proceedings of the.
7th South Asia Economic Summit (SAES)
5-7 November 2014 New Delhi, India.
Large Value (Wholesale) Payment and Settlement Systems around the Globe.
Large Value (Wholesale) Payment and Settlement Systems around the Globe.
LVPS are managed by the Central Banks.
LVPS are Systemically important financial market infrastructure and critical for smooth functioning of the national and International financial system.
The FEDWIRE is the LVPS in the USA. TARGET2 is the LVPS in the European Monetary Union. TARGET2 is a unique system as it is a common LVPS among many nations in the EMU. CNAPS is the LVPS in China. CLS System is unique as it is a global FX settlement system.
CIPS of China and CHIPS of USA are also LVPS but are used as offshore clearing and settlement system.
From Reducing risk and increasing resilience in RTGS payment systems.
Real Time Gross Settlement (RTGS) is a clumsy term for a crucial process in the financial markets. This is the reduction of counterparty credit risk by the delivery of cash or the delivery of securities in exchange for cash, instantaneously and without the netting of the obligations outstanding between the parties. Since the 1980s, the central banks which operate payment market infrastructures (PMIs)1 around the world have gradually adopted RTGS for the settlement of high value payments (HVP). Their private sector equivalents which settle low value payments (LVP) are also gravitating towards RTGS. In RTGS settlement, credit risk is reduced because cash is transferred between banks continuously in real time, transaction by transaction. Every payment is settled finally and irrevocably in central bank money, obviating the need to settle obligations between banks in batches on a net basis.
The role of a PMI is to provide predictable and secure multilateral payment services to banks and their corporate and retail clients, usually within a single country, but sometimes across several countries within a region. They tend to divide into two broad groups.
The first are HVP systems, which settle a relatively low volume of high value and high priority payments.
The second are LVP systems, which are also known as Retail Payment Systems (RPS), because they net relatively high volumes of low value and low priority payments.
There is a further distinction to be made between HVP systems. Not all HVP systems settle on a gross basis in real time (RTGS). Some settle on a net basis, in which case they are technically described as High Value Payment Deferred Net Settlement (HVP DNS) systems. This is because settlement of transactions does not take place instantaneously but is instead deferred until transactions can be aggregated into batches, and the sums owed by one bank to another netted into a single net payment, made either at the end of the business day or at regular intervals throughout the business day. The net settlement typically takes place in central bank money at the RTGS. LVP or RPS systems tend to net transactions in a fashion comparable with HVP DNS systems. Operated mainly by automated clearing houses (ACHs), they aggregate and net transactions between banks, and then settle net amounts between banks in central bank money at the RTGS either in a single payment at the end of the business day or in multiple payments made at regular intervals throughout the day. Although a variety of net settlement systems persist, more than half the PMIs in the world are now RTGS, and even net settlement systems ultimately settle in RTGS (see Chart 1).
It follows that RTGS systems are crucial to the settlement of both HVP, LVP and CSD transactions. In fact, the purpose of every RTGS is to provide final, irrevocable settlement of transactions in a specific currency, usually through the transfer of the reserves held by banks at the central bank. They act on payment instructions, and settle transaction by simultaneously debiting the account of the paying bank and crediting the account of the receiving bank. Reserves are a vital tool of monetary policy. They are the cash balances that banks are required to hold at central banks, both to limit the ability of banks to lend deposits without limit, and to guarantee the stability of the financial system by ensuring banks can always settle their obligations to each other. This makes RTGS an essential tool for every central bank in managing the stability of the financial system, because it is a means by which it can inject and withdraw liquidity (see Chart 2).
From Reducing risk and increasing resilience in RTGS payment systems.
From Reducing risk and increasing resilience in RTGS payment systems.
History and Evolution of RTGS.
Since they emerged in the late 1990s, RTGS systems have become the industry standard for settlement of high value payments. In 1985, only three countries in the world operated an RTGS system. By December 1999, when the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) published the first draft of what became the ten Core Principles for Systemically Important Payment Systems, the number had risen to 25 countries. After the publication of the final version of the Core Principles, the number of countries operating RTGS systems grew exponentially (see Chart 4). In July 2000, the final version of the BIS Core Principles paper declared, “there has been extensive progress in payment system design in the course of the past ten years, notably in the development and widespread adoption of systems involving real-time gross settlement (RTGS), which can very effectively address the financial risks highlighted by the Core Principles”.3 Today, the adoption of RTGS systems continues to grow, and has reached 124 systems supporting payments in 160 countries.4.
Regional (Cross Border) RTGS.
The fact that more countries enjoy the benefits of an RTGS system than there are RTGS systems in existence reflects the fact that several RTGS systems are used by more than one country. Obvious examples include the TARGET2 system operated by the European Central Bank (ECB) in the euro-zone, the shared platform operated by the Banque Centrale des Etats de l’Afrique de l’Ouest (BCEAO) in west Africa, and the equivalent platform operated by the Banque des Etats de l’Afrique Centrale (BEAC) in central Africa.
Systemic Importance of RTGS.
As RTGS systems are adopted by more countries, their systemic importance is increasing. Cross-border transactions mean domestic RTGS systems are also becoming part of a global network of RTGS systems, which in turn links the capital market infrastructures of each country with the capital infrastructures of every country. Domestic PMIs, CSDs and banks are now all part of a complex international eco-system.
In some parts of the world, such as the European Union and west and central Africa, RTGS systems are now formally operating on a regional basis (see Table 1). Some of these regional systems operate from a single shared RTGS platform, while others link a number of separate RTGS platforms. In these regions, it is obvious that the failure of an RTGS system can no longer be confined to one country only. But the same is true of RTGS systems everywhere. They are systemically important, and on a global scale.
From Global Trends in Large-Value Payments.
Globalization and technological innovation are two of the most pervasive forces affecting the financial system and its infrastructure. Perhaps nowhere are these trends more apparent than in the internationalization and automation of payments. The evolving landscape is most obvious in retail payments. The use of paper checks is in rapid decline or has been eliminated in most of the industrialized world. Credit and debit cards can be used in the most surprising places. Internet banking with money transfer capabilities is common, and several providers are competing to service consumers’ payments over the Internet and mobile devices.
In wholesale, or interbank, payments, the effect of globalization and technological innovation is probably less obvious to the casual observer—but it has been equally impressive. Given the importance of payments and settlement systems to the smooth operation as well as resiliency of the financial system, stakeholders need to understand and assess the potential consequences of this evolution. This article offers an in-depth look at the current environment for large-value payments systems (LVPSs). We describe ten trends common to LVPSs around the world and identify the key drivers of these developments and the most important policy issues facing central banks (see box). Furthermore, we provide empirical support for each of the trends by using numerous publicly available sources, including Bank for International Settlements (BIS) statistics on payments and settlement systems in selected countries (the “Red Book”). We focus on large-value payments systems in countries where the central bank is a member of the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems (CPSS), a body under the auspices of the BIS (Appendix A).
Technological innovation, structural changes in banking, and the evolution of central bank policies are the three main reasons for the recent developments in large-value payments. First, technological innovation has created opportunities to make existing large-value payments systems safer and more efficient. Such innovation has also accommodated the industry’s growing need for new types of systems that are not limited to a single country or a currency. Second, the financial sector has experienced immense growth over the last few decades accompanied by changes in the role of individual firms and the products they offer. In addition, financial institutions and their services have become increasingly globalized. These structural changes have affected how participants use largevalue payments systems. Third, the role of central banks in large-value payments systems has changed significantly in recent years. Central banks have become more involved in payments systems and have created formal and systematic oversight functions. The main focus lies in promoting safety and efficiency in LVPSs and in maintaining overall financial stability. Central banks therefore have taken more active roles in monitoring existing and planned systems, in assessing systems according to international standards, and, if necessary, in inducing change.
From Global Trends in Large-Value Payments.
From Global Trends in Large-Value Payments.
As the box illustrates, the ten trends that we describe can be assigned to three key drivers.
The first four trends.
the diffusion of real-time gross settlement (RTGS) systems, the take-off of hybrid systems, the emergence of cross-border and offshore systems, and the rise of Continuous Linked Settlement (CLS) Bank.
are all associated with settlement technology and fall into the first category. Technological innovation has enabled new settlement methodologies to emerge that allow a better balance between settlement risks, immediacy, and liquidity requirements. RTGS systems have to a large extent replaced deferred net settlement (DNS) systems. However, the high liquidity needs associated with RTGS have led some system operators to explore liquidity-saving mechanisms and have motivated them to develop hybrid systems. Developments in payments system technology have also facilitated the emergence of systems that settle payments across national borders in one or more currencies. In addition, the clearing of payments is in some instances moving offshore and the ability of participants to connect remotely—eliminating the need for a physical “footprint” in the jurisdiction of LVPSs—is becoming more widespread. Foreign exchange (FX) settlement and counterparty risk are being managed more tightly in part because of the use of payment-versus-payment (PvP) mechanisms.1 CLS Bank operates a multicurrency payments system for the simultaneous settlement of both sides of a foreign exchange transaction on a PvP basis. With CLS Bank, existing risks associated with FX trades are virtually eliminated.
The next three trends.
increasing settlement values and volumes, shrinking average payment sizes, and falling numbers of system participants.
as well as the emergence of crossborder and offshore systems (Trend 3) fall into the second category. They are determined largely by how the banking sector uses payments systems and by the structural changes taking place therein. The values and volumes originated over LVPSs grew exponentially until the turn of the century. However, in terms of value, growth has since slowed and is no longer outpacing economic growth as measured by GDP. Because many LVPSs process a large amount of relatively low-value payments, the average payment size settled has shrunk. Hence, the dichotomy between small - and large-value payments systems is not always applicable. In addition, consolidation in the banking sector has led to fewer participants in LVPSs. Structural changes have also resulted in the emergence of global banks that require a global payment infrastructure, which in turn has led to the creation of new systems that accommodate these needs.
The last three trends and the rise of CLS Bank (Trend 4) fall into the third category. They are associated with central banks’ operating policies regarding LVPSs. The service level of all systems is improving with longer operating hours. Some systems are even approaching a twenty-four-hour settlement cycle. Transaction costs in various LVPSs have been falling since the late 1990s because the savings achieved through improvements in operating efficiency have been passed on to system participants in the form of lower fees. Through the adoption of common standards, such as the CPSS’ Core Principles for Systemically Important Payments Systems, risk management in LVPSs has become more standardized. Furthermore, the central bank community was the driving force behind the development of CLS Bank.
These networks are also known as High Value payment (HVPS) networks.
List of LVPS Systems in some countries.
International Foreign Exchange FX Networks.
From Global Trends in Large-Value Payments.
From Clearing and Settlement Systems from Around the World: A Qualitative Analysis.
From Cross-Border Inter-Bank Payments System/Wikipedia.
China’s Cross-border Inter-bank Payment System (CIPS)
The Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) is a payment system which, offers clearing and settlement services for its participants’ in cross-border RMB payments and trade. It is a significant financial market infrastructure in China. As planned, CIPS will be developed in two phases. On 8th October 2015, CIPS (Phase I) went live. The first batch of direct participants includes 19 Chinese and foreign banks which were set up in mainland China and 176 indirect participants which cover 6 continents and 47 countries and regions. On 25th March 2016, CIPS signed an MoU with SWIFT with mu - tual understanding of deploying SWIFT as a secure, effi - cient and reliable communication channel for CIPS’s con - nection with SWIFT’s members, which would provide a network that enables financial institutions worldwide to send and receive information about financial transactions in a secure, standardised and reliable environment. CIPS is sometimes referred to as the China Interbank Pay - ment System.
CIPS would not facilitate funds transfer; rather, it sends payment orders, which must be settled by correspondent accounts that the institutions have with each other. Each financial institution, to exchange banking transactions, must have a banking relationship by either being a bank or affiliating itself with one (or more) so as to enjoy those particular business features.
However, it was reported in July 2015 that CIPS would be ‘”watered down” and used only for cross-border yuan trade deals rather than including capital-related transac - tions, which would delay billions of dollars worth of trans - actions, including securities purchases and foreign direct investment, that would have gone through the system. It was reported to be a second setback to the plan to provide a unified network for settling deals in yuan after technical problems delayed its launch, and that other measures to open up China’s financial infrastructure have been dented by the 2015 Chinese stock market crash. It was said to now offer, at best, a complementary network for settling trade-related deals in the Chinese currency to a current patchwork of Chinese clearing banks around the world.[1]
TARGET2 – Eurosystem Cross Border RTGS System.
TARGET2 (Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross Settlement Express Transfer System) is the real - time gross settlement (RTGS) system for the Eurozone, and is available to non-Eurozone countries. It was devel - oped by and is owned by the Eurosystem. TARGET2 is based on an integrated central technical infrastructure, called the Single Shared Platform (SSP).[1] SSP is operated by three providing central banks: France (Banque de France), Germany (Deutsche Bundesbank) and Italy (Banca d’Italia). TARGET2 started to replace TARGET in November 2007.
TARGET2 is also an interbank RTGS payment system for the clearing of cross-border transfers in the eurozone. Participants in the system are either direct or indirect. Di - rect participants hold an RTGS account and have access to real-time information and control tools. They are re - sponsible for all payments sent from or received on their accounts by themselves or any indirect participants op - erating through them. Indirect participation means that payment orders are always sent to and received from the system via a direct participant, with only the relevant di - rect participant having a legal relationship with the Eu - rosystem. Finally, bank branches and subsidiaries can choose to participate in TARGET2 as multi-addressee access or addressable BICs (Bank Identifier Code).
Since the establishment of the European Economic Community in 1958, there has been a progressive movement towards a more integrated European financial market. This movement has been marked by several events: In the field of payments, the most visible were the launch of the euro in 1999 and the cash changeover in the euro area countries in 2002. The establishment of the large-value central bank payment system TARGET was less visible, but also of great importance. It formed an integral part of the introduction of the euro and facilitated the rapid integration of the euro area money market.
The implementation of TARGET2 was based on a decision of the ECB Council of autumn 2002. TARGET2 started operations on 19 November 2007, when the first group of countries (Austria, Cyprus, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta and Slovenia) migrated to the SSP. This first migration was successful and con - firmed the reliability of SSP. After this initial migration, TARGET2 already settled around 50% of overall traffic in terms of volume and 30% in terms of value.
On 18 February 2008, the second migration successfully migrated to TARGET2, comprising Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain.
On 19 May 2008, the final group migrated to TARGET2, comprising Denmark, Estonia, Greece, Italy, Poland and the ECB. The six-month migration process went smoothly and did not cause any operational disruptions.
Slovakia joined TARGET2 on 1 January 2009, Bulgaria joined in February 2010, and Romania joined on 4 July 2011.
A unique feature of TARGET2 is the fact that its payment services in euro are available across a geographical area which is larger than the euro area. National central banks which have not yet adopted the euro also have the option to participate in TARGET2 to facilitate the settlement of transactions in euro. When new Member States join the euro area the participation in TARGET2 becomes mandatory. The use of TARGET2 is mandatory for the settlement of any euro operations involving the Eurosystem.
As of February 2016, 25 central banks of the EU and their respective user communities are participating in, or connected to, TARGET2:
The 20 euro area central banks (including the ECB) and five central banks from non-euro area countries: Bulgaria, Croatia, Denmark, Poland and Romania.
From The Continuous Linked Settlement foreign exchange settlement system (CLS)
Continuous Linked Settlement (CLS)
Continuous Linked Settlement (CLS) is an international payment system which was launched in September 2002 for the settlement of foreign exchange transactions. In the conventional settlement of a foreign exchange transaction the exchange of the two currencies involved in the trade is not normally synchronous. For one party to the trade there is therefore a risk that it will transfer the currency it has sold without receiving from the counterparty the currency it has bought (settlement risk). Even if a bank’s risk position vis-à-vis a counterparty is short-term, it may be many times greater than its capital. With CLS, an infrastructure has been created which eliminates settlement risk by means of a payment-versus-payment (PvP)2 mechanism.
CLS has 59 direct participants and more than 6,000 indirect participants (as of October 2009), and in 2008 it settled on average around 546,000 instructions to a value of around USD 4 trillion a day.3 Because of the vast volume of transactions on the global foreign exchange market, with its risk-reducing settlement mechanism CLS makes a significant contribution to the stability of the global financial system. By now, around a half of all foreign exchange transactions in the world are settled via CLS.4 The Swiss franc was one of the currencies settled in CLS from the very start, together with the US dollar, the pound sterling, the Japanese yen, the Canadian dollar, the Australian dollar and the euro. By now, the number of currencies settled in CLS has expanded from seven to 17. The Danish krone, the Norwegian krone, the Singapore dollar and the Swedish krona joined in September 2003, followed by the Hong Kong dollar, the Korean won, the New Zealand dollar and the South African rand in December 2004. The last two currencies up to now, the Israeli shekel and the Mexican peso, joined in May 2008.
CHIPS is the largest private-sector U. S.-dollar funds-transfer system in the world, clearing and settling an average of $1.5 trillion in cross-border and domestic payments daily. It combines best of two types of payments systems: the liquidity efficiency of a netting system and the intraday finality of a RTGS.
The Clearing House Interbank Payments System (CHIPS®1) is a funds-transfer system that transmits and settles payment orders in U. S. dollars for some of the largest and most active banks in the world. On an average day, CHIPS transmits and settles over 430,000 “payment messages”2 worth an aggregate of $1.5 trillion. It has been estimated that CHIPS carries a very high percentage of all international interbank funds transfers that are denominated in U. S. dollars. For these reasons, CHIPS has been widely regarded as a systemically important payment system, and on July 18, 2012, FSOC designated The Clearing House Payments Company L. L.C. (), which owns and operates CHIPS, as a systemically important financial market utility (SIFMU) under Title VIII of the Dodd-Frank Act on the basis of its role as the operator of CHIPS.3.
A Câmara de Compensação.
The Clearing House11 was founded in 1853, and is the oldest, most innovative bank association and payments processor in the United States. Established to simplify the daily check exchanges in New York City, The Clearing House later became a pioneer in the emerging field of electronic funds transfers and continues to be a leader in the payments arena, operating in addition to CHIPS, an automated clearinghouse (ACH) known as EPN (Electronic Payments Network), and a check-image clearinghouse. PaymentsCo continues to pioneer in emerging areas of the payment system in its work to protect account credentials through tokenization12 and to design and build a new low-value real-time payment system13 for the United States.
CHIPS is a real-time system for transmitting and settling high-value U. S.-dollar payments among its participating banks. The Clearing House began operating CHIPS in 1970 to simplify and expedite interbank payments in New York City.
Backed by over 44 years of reliable operation, CHIPS serves 49 foreign and domestic banks,14 representing 21 countries, through a network of sending and receiving devices, which range from microcomputers to large-scale mainframe computers. CHIPS participants include U. S. commercial banks and foreign banks with offices in the United States.
Payment and settlement systems in selected countries.
Prepared by the Committee on Payment and Settlement Systems of the Group of Ten Countries.
Payment, clearing and settlement systems in the CPSS countries.
Payment, clearing and settlement systems in the CPSS countries.
Payment, clearing and settlement systems in the United States.
Payment, clearing and settlement systems in Japan.
Payment, clearing and settlement systems in the United Kingdom.
Payment and securities settlement systems in the euroPean union.
Payment, clearing and settlement systems in the euro area.
PAYMENT AND SECURITIES SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION.
Payment, clearing and settlement systems in India.
A Primer on Canada’s Large Value Transfer System.
Payment, clearing and settlement systems in Canada.
Global Trends in Large-Value Payments.
Morten L. Bech, Christine Preisig, and Kimmo Soramäki.
Reducing risk and increasing resilience in RTGS payment systems.
The Continuous Linked Settlement foreign exchange settlement system (CLS)
Overview of the U. S. Payments, Clearing and Settlement Landscape.
International payment arrangements.
International Settlements: A New Source of Systemic Risk?
ROBERT A. EISENBEIS.
Clearing and Settlement Systems from Around the World: A Qualitative Analysis.
SYSTEMIC RISK IN INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS.
ESRC Centre for Business Research, University of Cambridge.
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Payment systems to facilitate South Asian integration.
PAYMENT SYSTEMS TO FACILITATE SOUTH ASIAN INTRA - REGIONAL TRADE.
Federal Reserve Policy on Payment System Risk.
As amended effective September 23, 2016.
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Overview of payment system settlement.
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Evolution of payment systems in India – or is it a revolution?
Speech by Mr R Gandhi, Deputy Governor of the Reserve Bank of India.
Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi, 22 October 2016.
How Modernizing India’s Payment System can Drive Financial Inclusion.
By Sean Creehan.
Payment Systems in India: Opportunities and Challenges.
Payment Systems in India and Current Status: A Perspective.
March 2016 by Graham Wright and Anil Kumar Gupta.
PAYMENT AND SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS.
NPCI playing a key role in India’s push towards cashless economy.
India Has The Most Sophisticated Payments System In The World – And Six Men Made It Happen.
R Jagannathan – Apr 12, 2016,
Supervision of U. S. Payment, Clearing, and Settlement Systems: Designation of Financial Market Utilities (FMUs)
Specialist in Macroeconomic Policy.
September 10, 2012.
Interdependencies among payment and settlement systems Overview of forms and.
challenges for risk management.
SELECTED ISSUES ON LIQUIDITY RISK MANAGEMENT IN FEDWIRE FUNDS AND PRIVATE SECTOR PAYMENT SYSTEMS.
TECHNICAL NOTE MAY 2010.
Managing Operational Risk in Payment, Clearing, and Settlement Systems.
Interdependencies of payment and settlement systems: the Hong Kong experience.
Fundamentals oF Payment systems.
GLOSSARY OF TERMS RELATED TO PAYMENT, CLEARING AND SETTLEMENT SYSTEMS.
Central bank oversight of payment and settlement systems.
Creating an Association of Southeast Asian Nations Payment System: Policy and Regulatory Issues.
No. 422 May 2013.
Oversight of payment and settlement systems.
Pagamento e amp; Settelment System in India.
Payment and Settlement Systems in India.
Clearing House Interbank Payments System (“CHIPS®”)
Self-Assessment of Compliance with Standards for Systemically Important Payment Systems.
Supervision of Payment, Clearing and Settlement.
The Continuous Linked Settlement foreign exchange settlement system (CLS)
Indian Payments Industry: Mobile POS Solutions.
Payment systems in Sweden.
CIPS and the International Role of the Renminbi.
January 27, 2016.
By Nicholas Borst.
Chinese Central Bank has introduced CIPS (Cross-Border Interbank Payment System)
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